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ARTICLES
A PERSPECTIVE ON THE DEBT CRISIS
Jerome I. Levinson*
INTRODUCTION
The debt crisis, which is the high level of indebtedness of a signifi-
cant number of developing countries in Latin America, Asia, and Af-
rica is generally considered a severe inhibition on the ability of those
countries to modernize structures within their own societies so as to
become economically and internationally competitive and socially and
politically more stable societies.' The international community must
address what role external finance plays in this underlying chronic con-
dition in light of the extraordinary level of indebtedness contracted in
the last fifteen years. The issue is particularly appropriate to address
in Washington D.C., because there is currently a ferment of ideas con-
cerning this subject in this city.
The question basically revolves around what: (a) the debtor coun-
tries; (b) the private commercial banks; (c) the creditor Governments;
and (d) the multilateral financing institutions should contribute to a
resolution of the problem. More specifically, increased attention now
focuses on the question of reduction of outstanding indebtedness of the
* Mr. Levinson was Counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Mul-
tinational Corporations (1972-1977); he was General Counsel of the Inter-American
Development Bank (1977-1989), and is presently the Senior Special Adviser to the
President of the Bank on assignment in London. The ideas expressed arc his own and in
no way reflect, officially or unofficially, a position of the Inter-American Development
Bank.
1. See THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEBT TABLES, EXTERNAL DEBT OF DEVELOP-
ING COUNTRIES, 1 ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY TALES xxviii (1987-88) [hereinafter THE
WORLD BANK] (noting the total indebtedness of these regions at the end of 1986).
2. See UNITED STATES GENERAL AccoUNTING OFFICE, INT'L BANKING: SUPERVI-
SION OF OVERSEAS LENDING IS INADEQUATE, 27 (May 1988) [hereinafter GAO RE-
PORT] (noting that Brazil owes 23.62 billion as of October 1987, Mexico owes 23.22
billion, and South Korea owes 6.38 billion to U.S. commercial banks).
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debtor countries: do debt reduction schemes contribute to such a reso-
lution or complicate it still further by discouraging "new" money pack-
ages of lending? This paper will attempt to place the current debate in
perspective, draw some lessons from the past, and hazard some
thoughts as to the future.
PHASE I: A CORNUCOPIA OF FINANCE 1974-1982
In the late 1960s, the onset of a simultaneous economic expansion in
the major industrialized nations led to a fundamental change in the
supply-demand equation in the trade of international crude oil supplies,
that favored the producing nations. The immediately available supply
of crude oil was not keeping up with the demand. This condition was
exacerbated by the increased awareness of environmental considera-
tions in the industrialized countries, which placed a premium upon the
availability of low sulphur-"sweet" crude oil, as it is known in the
trade. Negotiations between the oil producing exporting countries
(OPEC) and the multinational oil companies reflected this tightening
supply of crude oil in relation to demand.3 The crisis assumed explosive
dimensions in the aftermath of the October 1973 Yom Kippur War
between Israel, Egypt, and Syria."
The United States ran out of spare capacity, that is, the capacity to
increase the production of crude oil almost immediately.5 The 1973
Arab oil embargo of the United States then masked severe production
problems in major oil reservoirs in Saudi Arabia, resulting in large part
3. See Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on the Multinat7 Corp. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign ReL.,
93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (Part 5) 176-90 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 Hearings on Multinat'l
Corp.] (statement of George T. Piercy, Senior V.P. and Director, Exxon Corp.). These
negotiations occurred in Tehran and Tripoli in late 1970 and 1971. Id. at 211. The
testimony describes the loss of spare capacity in the late 1960s and early 1970s outside
of the Persian Gulf area and how this contributed to a weakening of the bargaining
position of the multinational oil companies with the cartel of OPEC; see id. at 211-17
(questioning of Senators Edmund Muskie (D-Me.), and Frank Church (D-Id.) on this
issue); see also Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy; Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on the Multinat'l Corp. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Rel., 93 Cong., 2d Sess. (Part 7) 331-41 (1974) [hereinafter Multinational Corps. and
Foreign Policy] (prepared statement of George T. Piercy, Senior V.P. and Director,
Exxon Corp.).
4. Multinat'l Corps. and Foreign Policy, supra note 3, at 513-15 (exhibit 11). The
cables from Aramco to its owner companies in the United States-Exxon, Texaco,
Standard Oil Company of California, and Mobil-detail the instructions from Saudi
Arabian authorities to cut back oil production. Id.
5. See 1974 Hearings on Multinat'l Corp., supra note 3, at 176-179 (statement of




from the failure of water injection facilities to function as planned.' As
a result of this breakdown, Saudi Arabia would have had to curtail
production of crude oil or risk permanent damage to the producing res-
ervoirs (less oil would have been ultimately recovered if production
continued under prevailing conditions). The embargo, therefore, came
at a convenient time both for the government of Saudi Arabia and the
multinational oil companies that made up the Aramco consortium.'
In the aftermath of the embargo, oil producers dramatically in-
creased the price of crude oil. Between October 1973 and January
1974, the international price of crude oil increased nearly fivefold over
its price in 1971.8 In August 1974, the United States Secretary of the
Treasury, William Simon, observed that the revenues of the oil produc-
ing countries in the OPEC cartel were running at an annual rate of
$100 billion, of which $60 billion needed recycling." Secretary Simon
was referring to the fact that the greatest part of the $100 billion ac-
crued to those oil producers who could not spend all of their oil reve-
nues on imports from the oil consuming states. Unless they curtailed oil
production, they would earn approximately $60 billion that would need
6. Multinational Corps. and Foreign Policy, supra note 3, at 483-503 (exhibits 3-
6). The subcommittee hearings examined additional technical details on water injection
as a means to increase output, and the resulting problems. Id. at 483-503. The trip
reports by engineers of Standard Oil Company of California analyze the failure of the
water injection program. Id. at 491.
7. Id. at 442, 445 (testimony of William W. Messick, Executive Staff, Production
Aramco) (citing numerous oil production problems). The Arabian American Oil Com-
pany was a joint venture consortium of companies organized as a Delaware Corpora-
tion. The four companies that owned Aramco were Exxon, Mobile, Texaco, and Stan-
dard Oil Company of California (SOCAL). Id. SOCAL was the company that
originally discovered oil in Saudi Arabia. Id. In 1936, SOCAL and Texaco formed
Aramco to administer the Bahrain and Saudi Arabian crude concessions, the new
Bahrain refinery, and the Eastern marketing outlets which, from then on, were collec-
tively known as the "Caltex" companies. Id. In 1947, agreement was reached between
Caltex and Exxon and Mobil (then known respectively as the Standard Oil Company
of New Jersey, and Standard Vacuum Company) to sell a percentage of the stock in
Aramco to Exxon and Mobil. Id. The final stock ownership resulted in Exxon, SOCAL
and Texaco each receiving 30 percent of the stock ownership interest in Aramco by
buying out the ownership interests on the American companies. Id. at 78-82 (statement
of Barbara J. Svedberg, Former Trial Att'y of the Antitrust Division, United States
Dep't of Justice) (discussing the development of the Middle East oil concessions); see
also id. at 192-215 (testimony of Joseph J. Johnston, Senior V.P. Arabian Am. Oil Co.
(Aramco)) (describing the operations of Aramco and its relationship with its prior.
shareholder companies). See generally I. ANDERSON, Aitmico, THE U.S. AND SAUDI
ARABIA (1981) (describing the history of Aramco from the company point of view).
8. Multinat7 Corporations and United States Foreign Policy: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Multinat'l Corps. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rel., 93rd Cong., 2d
Sess. 259 (1974) (Part 9) (testimony of William E. Simon, Secretary of Treasury)
[hereinafter Simon Testimony]. The testimony notes that oil prices doubled during
1971-1973, and increased fourfold between 1973-1974. Id. at 245.
9. Id. at 237.
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to be placed somewhere.1"
Simon developed a program that enabled these oil producers and
other official agencies of foreign governments to purchase United
States Government securities at market prices directly from the United
States government by special procedures, bypassing the financial mar-
kets.11 This program had the advantage of assuring the foreign govern-
ment purchasers confidentiality and at the same time helping to finance
the United States government's fiscal deficit. The exact amount of
these transactions was not revealed;12 however, they were insufficient to
eliminate the financial surpluses of the Persian Gulf oil producers re-
sulting from the run up in oil prices. A significant part of the surplus
still had to be placed in the financial markets.
The London market was particularly attractive. A market in dollars
outside of the United States had developed in London in which there
were no reserve requirements and virtually no regulatory standards.1
Each of the New York money center banks, as well as the larger
United States West Coast, Middle West, and regional banks estab-
lished branches or subsidiaries in London.1" Major Japanese and Conti-
nental European financial institutions also established operations in
London to cash in on the petrodollar bonanza.'8 The London market,
therefore, became the means through which a great part of the finan-
cial surpluses of the OPEC oil producers was absorbed by the Western
financial world.' 6
As Secretary Simon put it, "we observed that the private financial
system was doing a remarkable job of handling very large expanded
operations." 17 "As for the role of governments in facilitating the flow of
10. Id.
11. Id. at 238; see also id. at 276 (explaining the program in response to a question
by Senator Percy).
12. The Witteveen Facility and the OPEC Financial Surpluses: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Foreign Econ. Pol'y of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rel., 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1977) [hereinafter 1977 Hearings on Witteveen Facility] (state-
ment of Eugene Sherman, V.P., Merrill Lynch Gov't Sec., Inc.).
13. STAFF OF THE SENATE SUBCOMM. ON FOREIGN ECON. POL'Y OF THE COMM. ON
FOREIGN REL., 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS. (1977), REPORT ON INT'L DEBT, THE BANKS
AND U.S. FOREIGN POL'Y 23 [hereinafter INT'L DEBT].
14. Id. at 10-11.
15. Id. at 26-27.
16. See INT'L DEBT, supra note 13, at 15-23 (offering a good account of the origin
of the Euro-currency market); see also American Foreign Economic Policy: an Over-
view: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Economic Policy of the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Rel., 95th Cong. 1st Sess. at 89-92 [hereinafter American Foreign
Economic Policy) (statements of Robert Mundell, Professor, Columbia University, and
Lawrence Krause, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institute) (examining the necessity of a
"financial intermediary" for the OPEC monetary surplus).
17. Simon Testimony, supra note 8, at 237.
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money in the recycling process," said Simon, "the first responsibility of
governments is to maintain those economic and financial conditions
conducive to sound economic activity."18 In other words, the task of
recycling the vast financial surpluses that few oil producing states accu-
mulated was to be left to the private banking sector. In Simon's view,
the private banking sector could be expected to act responsibly in mak-
ing sound credit judgments and not lend beyond prudent limits19
Upon accepting these interest bearing short-term deposits, the com-
mercial banks faced the problem of how to lend them out at a profit.
The oil importing Western industrial powers no longer provided a
promising market. As a response to the massive oil price increases of
1973 and 1974, these countries adjusted their economies by adopting
severe deflationary policies.20 Economic activity in the United States,
Western Europe, and Japan declined.2 ' In then recessionary economic
conditions, industrial enterprises saw no need to borrow to expand ca-
pacity.22 For the oil importing developing countries, however, the fact
that the Western financial institutions were rich with cash deposited
with them by the oil producing states was fortuitous. Rather than "ad-
just" to the oil price increases by deflating their economies, they pre-
ferred to borrow to pay their current oil bills and maintain high rates
of economic growth.2 In effect, recycling the financial surpluses of the
oil producers meant that the oil producers became creditors of the eco-
nomically strongest country in the West, the United States, and of the
great multinational banks of the Western industrialized countries.2
These banks, in turn, took the credit risks of lending to the economi-
cally weaker oil importing states.25 The risk of default by these weaker
18. Id. at 238.
19. See id. at 237 (observing that the European private sector was successfully
doing this).
20. See BELASSA, TOWARD RENEWED ECONOMIC GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA 68
(1986) (commenting on doubled debt-service ratio between 1973-1978).
21. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, A Survey, 4 Occa-
sional Paper 7-8, (June, 1981).
22. Id.
23. Hartland & Thurberg, Sources and Implications of the Global Debt Crisis, 9
VASH. Q. 95 (1986). This article contains a very good discussion of the two oil price
shocks of 1973-74 and 1979-80, following the fall of the Shah. Id. The authors note the
non-OPEC LDCs continued to expand their economies after the first oil shock, but not
after the second one, in part due to different policy responses in the industrialized coun-
tries. Id.
24. 1977 Hearings on Witteveen, supra note 12, at 8 (statement of Eugene Sher-
man, V.P. Merrill Lynch Gov't Sec., Inc.).
25. Id. at 23. Senators Javits and Church summarized the results of the policy in
graphic terms:
Senator Javits. It seems to me that the only thing that is really wrong with it
is that the U.S. Government becomes obligated for these vast amounts of funds.
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states, then, was assumed not by the oil producers who had created the
need to borrow because of increased oil prices, but by the banks-with
the central banks of the industrialized countries standing behind
them.28
Moreover, the existence of the Eurodollar market in London, later a
multi-currency market 17 enabled developing countries to escape the su-
pervision of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). Not only governments could borrow in the Eurodollar market,
but also autonomous government-owned entities with separate legal
personalities and their own financial resources independently borrowed,
often without the guarantee of repayment by the central government.
Private enterprises in the borrowing countries as well as official finan-
cial institutions appeared to have unrestricted access to these banks'
resources with minimum, if any, accountability.28
In a monograph written for the Twentieth Century Fund, the Brazil-
ian economist Marcilio Marques Moreira, later Ambassador to the
United States, observed with respect to Brazil that these resources
complemented domestic savings.2 9
We are facing a monumental-the Chair and I both feel this-and extremely
dangerous problem because we are holding the bag. We are holding it for the
developing countries; we are holding it for the commercial banks. By we, I mean
Uncle Sam. This very, very much concerns me.
Mr. Sherman. Yes, Senator. In this environment, the United States has be-
come the lender of the last resort for all purposes.
Senator Javits. For everybody.
Mr. Sherman. Yes.
Senator Church. Yes, that is the very point I wanted to make. This is all very
jolly, except that it demonstrates that the recycling of petrodollars is coming to
us, and I suppose to some extent to other wealthy industrial countries, to their
banks and increasingly through the commercial banks and their treasuries. Then
it is up to us to extend the credit of the third world countries. We are left hold-
ing the bag. We are obligated to repay these treasury bills, notes, and bonds to
the OPEC governments with large surpluses that continue to mount with each
passing year.
We lend the money to the debtor countries so that they may buy the oil and
other imports and we are left in an exposed position.
Id. at 15-16.
26. Id.
27. Int'l Debt, supra note 13, at 15. One comment that arose from the testimony
states, "Technically liabilities denominated in any currency which are on deposit in
banks located outside the country issuing the currency can be called eurodollars, or
euromarks or euroyen." Id.
28. 1977 Hearings on the Witteveen Facility, supra note 12, at 37-38 (statement of
Eugene Sherman, V.P. Merrill Lynch Gov't Sec., Inc.).
29. M. MOREIRA, THE BRAZILIAN QUANDARY, A TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND PA-
PER 22 (1986). Moreira stated:
These resources were mainly aimed at capital accumulation, not financial specu-
lation; they complemented domestic savings and did not encourage capital flight
(the proof is that the accumulated current account deficits were larger than the
494 [VOL. 4:489
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What was true of Brazil, to a greater or lesser degree, was also evi-
dent in other countries at equivalent stages of development which had
access to financing in the Eurocurrency markets. The productive plant
in these countries owned by the state or local entrepreneurs or some
combination of them rapidly expanded. South Korea, Taiwan, Singa-
pore, and Mexico, within a decade, emerged as leaders in the produc-
tion of steel, automotive parts, and electronic plants for the world mar-
ket. Although not yet in the class of Europe and Japan, these Newly
Industrializing Countries (NICs) were becoming world class players in
the international economy.30
A Fly in the Ointment
But there was a basic flaw in the borrowing strategy of the NICs: the
nature of the markets in which they were borrowing. The money bor-
rowed in the aftermath of the oil price revolution often had a maximum
eight-to-ten year maturity structure, some of it under innovative financ-
ing techniques due in a single "bullet" payment. The interest rate at
which banks in London lent surplus funds to each other, the London
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), was most commonly adjusted at six-
month intervals, depending upon prevailing market conditions.31 Hence,
this "floating" rate could be increased frequently if worldwide interest
rates rose over the life of a loan. The rapid buildup of debt in those
conditions was highly vulnerable to any shock that had the effect of
raising rates for the increasingly indebted NICs. That shock occurred
in 1979 with the revolution in Iran that toppled the Shah and his con-
servative government, and replaced it with a regime that, at least ini-
tially, preached austerity and reduced levels of oil production.
The multinational oil companies had allowed their oil stock invento-
ries to run down to minimum levels. In the aftermath of the Iranian
upheaval, fearing another oil shortage, the oil companies scrambled to
increase in net debt during the period); they were not the result of an overvalua-
tion of the cruzeiro; and although they might have been used for oversized
projects, they were neither spent on extravagant arms purchases (the military
regime preferred to export armaments rather than to import them), nor on lux-
ury consumption (even oil in Brazil is predominantly used for production, trans-
portation, and distribution of goods, rather than for recreational driving or resi-
dential heating). To paraphrase Veblen, the most serious sin might have been
overindulgence in conspicuous investments.
Id.
30. Not all of the borrowing was devoted to expanding productive capacity. Bor-
rowing financed capital flight and conspicuous consumption. And some countries, like
Argentina, were hard pressed to show that borrowing led to additional producing
facilities.
31. See Int'l Debt, supra note 13, at 17.
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replace depleted inventories and, in the process, bid up the price of
crude oil, which more than doubled in 1980. The NICs, which in the
aftermath of the first oil "shock" had borrowed heavily to maintain
investment levels and high economic growth rates, now found them-
selves having to borrow to pay interest on past loans and, increasingly,
to pay for current oil bills rather than for productive investment. 2
The Carter Administration initially sought to rejuvenate the United
States economy after the recessionary years that followed the oil price
revolution of 1973. By 1979, however, the economic expansion had
overheated, inflation was in double digits, and the prime rate was dra-
matically rising.3 The appointment by President Carter of Paul
Volcker as Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System signalled a determination to cool off the economic boom.
3 4
Monetary policy was slammed into reverse. By the time the Reagan
Administration assumed office in January 1981, an economic slowdown
in the United States was already well underway. The new Administra-
tion heartily endorsed the slowdown as a means to brake and, ulti-
mately, reverse inflationary expectations. 5
This slowdown was not limited in its economic effects to the domestic
economy of the United States. The United States was the largest econ-
omy in the world and, relative to other countries, open to a wide range
of imports. It constituted the most important market for the exports of
the NICs, as well as those of the fully industrialized countries.3 As the
32. INT'L MONETARY FUND, ANNUAL REPORT 21-22 (1985) [hereinafter IMF AN-
NUAL REPORT].
33. Id. at 2; see also MORGAN GUARANTEE TRUST CO. OF N.Y., WORLD FIN.
MARKETS, COUNTERING WORLD DEFLATION 1-3 (Dec. 1985) [hereinafter COUN-
TERING WORLD DEFLATION].
34. W. WRISTON, "Was I exacting? Sure. Was I occasionally sarcastic? Of
course," INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, June 1987, 17, 20. Wriston blames Volcker for the
onset of the debt crisis:
What nobody knew was that Volcker was going to lock the wheels of the world.
And when he threw the U.S. into the deepest recession since 1933, it spread to
the whole world. And that's what started, the quote international debt crisis:
Export ratios that looked very good the month before he took office looked like a
disaster a year later.
Id.
35. IMF ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 2 (1985). See also COUNTERING
WORLD DEFLATION, supra note 33, at 1.
36. IMF Annual Report, supra note 32, at 21.
The U.S. recovery was not of fundamental importance to countries seeking ex-
port-led adjustment ... U.S. imports from Asian and European developing
countries increased by some 80 percent between 1980 and 1984 .... In con-
trast, other industrial countries' imports from these regions were comparatively




United States economy went into reverse, the demand for imports
dropped precipitously.37 Export earnings of the NICs declined com-
mensurately, but the financial obligations they had contracted with the
major international banks remained. The conditions were ripe for an
international financial crisis. That crisis was precipitated in August
1982 when Mexican authorities travelled to Washington and informed
U.S. Treasury officials that they could not meet the interest payments
on their outstanding debts. 8
Unheeded Warnings
As early as 1975, the Multinational Corporations Subcommittee of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee sought to ascertain the risks
to the Western banking system in the recycling strategy that Secretary
Simon had celebrated in his testimony before the Subcommittee. On
September 11, 1975, the Subcommittee held a session closed to the
public because the issues to be explored were considered too sensitive to
be discussed in an open session."
The Subcommittee tried to determine whether there was a concen-
tration of deposits from the oil producing states in a small number of
major United States banks. It also tried to determine whether those
banks had become financially vulnerable by virtue of having lent large
amounts relative to their capital to the oil importing developing coun-
37. Id.
38. Mexico Seeking Postponement of Part of Debt, N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1982, at
1 (discussing Mexican meeting with New York banks); Debt-Ridden Mexico Gets U.S.
Help, Wash. Post, Aug. 19, 1982, at B3 (discussing Mexican plight and the one billion
contribution from the United States); see STAFF OF JOINT ECONO.IC Co1,%., COx-
GRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, 99TH CONG. 2D SEss., THE IMPACT OF THE LATIN
AMERICAN DEBT CRISIS ON THE U.S. ECONOMY I (May 1986) [hereinafter LATIN
AMERICAN DEBT CRISIS STUDY] (stating that the Latin American debt crisis became
public when Mexico announced its inability to service its debts in 1982); see also
Fidler, Debt Fatigue in Latin America, Fin. Times, Aug. 31, 1988, at 12.
39. Multinat'l Corps. and United States Foreign Policy: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Multinat'l Corps. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rel. (Part 15) 94th
Cong. 1st Sess. 17 (1975) (Executive Session, subsequently made public) [hereinafter
Multinat'ls and United States]. In addition to the Senators and staff of the Subcom-
mittee, present at the hearing were Hon. Philip E. Coldwell, Governor, Federal Reserve
System; Hon. Henry C. Wallich, Governor, Federal Reserve System; Hon. Paul
Volcker, President, New York Federal Reserve Bank; Hon. Thomas Enders, Assistant
Secretary for Economic Affairs, Department of State; Hon. Edwin Yeo, Under Secre-
tary for Monetary Affairs, Department of Treasury; C.A. Costanzo, Vice Chairman,
First National City Bank of New York; Gaylord Freeman, Chairman of the Board,
First National Bank of Chicago; Lewis Preston, Vice President, Morgan Guaranty and
Trust Bank; Leland S. Prussia, Cashier, Bank of America; Gary Welch, Legal Staff,
Federal Reserve; William Ogden, Chase National Bank; Lisle Widman, Department of
the Treasury.
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tries that could have difficulty in meeting their future debt service pay-
ments to these banks.40 The information was not published by any
United States Government Agency nor was it collected or analyzed by
the United States Government."1 The Subcommittee sought to collect
the data through use of a questionnaire.
Karin Lissakers, a Subcommittee staffer, in a question to Gaylord
Freeman, Chairman of the Board, First National Bank of Chicago,
asked: "[I]f Indonesia or Zaire or Brazil, or any of the larger interna-
tional powers, should default not only against your bank but against
five of the largest banks in the United States, what would be the
impact?
42
Speaking for the banks, Freeman assured the Subcommittee that,
"the loan side is pretty well covered by the recurrent examination of
the experienced examiners of the Comptroller's office and the FDIC
and the liability side is not a prospective source of significant
problems. '43 By the liability side, Freeman meant that holding short-
term deposits from the oil producing countries posed no risks of sudden
destabilizing withdrawals. The assembled bankers, the officials of the
Federal Reserve and the Treasury agreed with Freeman that there was
no problem-that the Banks lent no more than was prudent, that fed-
eral regulators were efficient and on top of the problem, and, that there
was no risk of the borrowing countries suddenly defaulting on their
loans.44
In 1977, the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee, which succeeded the Multinational
Corporations Subcommittee when it was voted out of existence in Octo-
ber 1976 by the Full Senate Foreign Relations Committee, further pur-
sued the matter with officials of the Carter Administration. Anthony
Solomon, Under-Secretary for Monetary Affairs of the Department of
the Treasury, observed in testimony before the Subcommittee:
[T]he question has been raised as to whether this rapid and unprecedented en-
largement of lending activity and debt has reached a danger point for the mone-
tary system, either in the sense that large numbers of countries have borrowed
beyond their capacity to service debt or in the sense that our banks and other
institutions are overextended. 5
40. Id. at 78.
41. Id. at 82-84.
42. Id. at 45 (statement of Karin Lissakers, Subcomm. Staff Member).
43. Id. at 39 (statement of Gaylord Freeman, Chairman of the Board, First Na-
tional Bank of Chicago).
44. Id.
45. 1977 Hearings on the Witteveen Facility, supra note 12, at 22 (testimony of
Anthony Solomon, Under-Secretary for Monetary Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Treasury).
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Answering his own formulation of the issue, Solomon stated: "It is our
considered judgment that the system as a whole is not in any such posi-
tion of imminent danger, either as a result of excessive borrowing by
large numbers of debtor nations or as a result of our financial institu-
tions being overstretched."46 Solomon noted that if the borrowed funds
are properly used to support productive investment and to strengthen
the borrower's current account position, the debt need not constitute a
serious future burden.47
But the Senators were not convinced. Senator Jacob Javits empha-
sized that there was no margin for error:
The difficulty with that theory is: It fails completely to take account of contin-
gencies, increase in price of OPEC oil, particular pressure in particular places
because of political situations in those places, the burden of debt becoming so
great compared to developmental needs-that is, Brazil-that a situation which
looked very good in credit terms may not look so good at a given time....,a
Senator Frank Church questioned whether the borrowed money was
being used for productive purposes, citing a study by the American Ex-
press Company:
In 1977, they estimated one-fourth of new loan money will go to repayment of
the loans and by 1981, half .. . .What is happening is that this new loan
money is not going into the expansion of economic growth, increased exports, to
enable these foreign countries to pay for their imports without having to borrow
still more heavily. Just the opposite is happening."
Senator Paul Sarbanes expressed skepticism as to the incentive for
the private banks to exercise prudence in their lending:
You think the private lenders have to a considerable extent been proceeding on
the premise when they make loans to sovereign governments, that there is no
possibility of default in those loans, first, because the sovereign government won't
want it to happen. But in any event even if they were not able to carry the
burden, that is the sovereign governments, particularly with respect to American
banks, the United States is not going to permit that to take place. Therefore,
they really don't have to exercise much care with respect to making those
loans. :o
But these warnings were not heeded. Secretary Simon in the Ford
Administration hailed the role of the private banks in recycling the fi-
nancial surpluses of the oil producers to the oil importing debtor coun-
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 28 (statement of Jacob Javits, Senator from New York).
49. Id. at 38-39 (statement of Frank Church, Senator from Idaho).
50. Id. at 38 (statement of Paul Sarbanes, Senator from Maryland).
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tries through commercial loans.51 The private banks assured the Mul-
tinational Corporations Subcommittee that they were prudent
lenders.52 The officials of the Federal Reserve System and the Comp-
troller of the Currency were satisfied with the recycling process."3 Mex-
ico, Brazil, and South Korea appeared to have as much leverage with
the banks in negotiating terms as the banks had with them. They could
rely less on the multilateral development banks and more on private
commercial markets to finance their development needs.
An alternative policy would have been to try to capture some sub-
stantial part of the petrodollar surpluses of the oil exporting countries
to be re-lent to the oil importing developing countries by the IMF,
World Bank, and regional development banks. The funds could then
have been placed with the borrowing countries on terms which were
more in line with their payment and development prospects. The use of
the funds for productive investments would have been more clearly
assured.
That this was not wholly unrealistic, in retrospect, is evidenced by
the comments of Johannes Witteveen, Managing Director of the IMF
in 1973 and Denis Healey, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer at
the time.
[M]any oil exporting countries would have been willing to lend a much larger
part of their surpluses to the fund . . . . The Iranians and the Saudis were the
most supportive . . . It was interesting that they gave that support to the IMF
and didn't make difficulties about the fact that Israel could draw on the
Facility.5
Witteveen further observed:
[I]f the main countries would have given more support to the [IMF] oil facility
at that point, the present debt problem would have been less serious. The influ-
ence of the fund on these [debtor] countries would have been better adjustments,
and the role of the banks would not have been so large.55
Witteveen noted, however, that the position of the industrial countries,
"[m]ainly the United States, has been . . . that these deficits should as
far as possible be financed through the markets, and only in cases
51. Simon Testimony, supra note 8, at 237 (commenting that the private financial
system did a "remarkable job" in handling such large operations).
52. Multinat'ls and United States, supra note 39, at 45-56 (statement of William
Ogden, Chase National Bank).
53. Id. at 60.
54. Witteveen, "We couldn't tell a country,'You shouldn't spend so much money
for buying airplanes; spend more for something else,"' INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR,




where they couldn't be completely financed through the market was
there a role for the fund."56
Denis Healey described his efforts:
I tried very hard, my early months as chancellor, to persuade my colleagues to
organize some sort of international, official scheme for recycling the OPEC sur-
pluses. But the Americans, particularly, were very hostile to this idea. Basically,
they didn't believe in government mucking around in what they thought should
be the role of the private sector. They would leave it all to the bankers who were
licking their lips at the thought of what they would get out of it.,,
An even more radical strategy was explored in the Congress, where
Senator Javits proposed not financing the oil import needs of the poorer
countries. 8 In the same hearing, Senator Church observed that the
United States was filling the role of the "fall guy."59 In words that in
retrospect appear prescient, Senator Sarbanes asked what happens if
the debtor countries decide not to pay back the loans they contracted. 0
56. Id.
57. Healey, "I thought, if I let the pound slide, then went to the IMF meeting, we
could be facing a very serious crisis," INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, June 1987, at 66, 66-
67 (Int'l Ed.).
58. American Foreign Economic Policy, supra note 16, at 23 (testimony of Wil-
liam Rogers, Former Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and Hon. Edwin
Yeo, Former Under Secretary of the Treasury). Senator Javits observed:
If it is a fact that we expect the current account deficit, because of oil imbalance,
of about a quarter of a trillion dollars in the next five or six years, and this
money is going to be loaned to us short, that is, on seven days or thereabout on
deposit, and then is being loaned out long, as our banks now have S50 to S70
billion of credit extended, which we estimate about $50 billion of which is ex-
tended to the LDC's, shall we simply turn around to the LDC's and say look, we
did not cause this, it is caused by your friends in the Asian-African bloc, so you
go and borrow from them? Why should we be the brokers through which this
very risky enterprise is conducted? After all, if there is a demand for a morato-
rium and if there are major defaults, the banks, as you and I both know, expect
that they are going to be bailed out by the IMF or the Federal Reserve. They
don't expect that the depositors will pay it, and they should not, as far as we are
concerned. The whole stability of this country leans on it.
Id. (statement of Senator Javits of New York).
59. Id. at 25 (statement of Senator Church of Idaho).
Senator Church stated:
What we are doing is making ourselves the fall guy. We are holding the bag. We
are extending the loans. As the pressure of these accumulating loans begins to
have its regressive effect on these economies, they will begin talking, indeed as
they are already talking, about restructuring the loans. They are dealing with us;
we are the creditor, and they are the debtor. I have never known very many
debtors who love their creditors.
Meanwhile, the OPEC countries over here who have created the whole prob-
lem are in Paris arm-in-arm with the lesser developed countries condemning the
Western World ....
Id.
60. Id. at 34 (statement of Paul Sarbanes, Senator from Maryland). The Senator
posited:
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Healey and Witteveen place the blame for a failed policy primarily
on United States policy makers. 1 The recycling strategy, however, had
advantages for everyone: the oil producers with surplus funds placed
those funds with the strongest financial institutions (and government)
in the industrialized world; those institutions expanded and made large
profits; the oil importing, borrowing countries received funds with very
few conditions attached to them; the United States government fi-
nanced a significant part of its deficit with funds of the oil producers.
The responsibility for reliance upon the recycling strategy may have
originated with Secretary Simon and the American Administration, but
it was a responsibility shared by the other major actors in the debt
drama-the oil producers, the oil importing debtor countries, and the
multinational banks.
In August 1982, the Mexican Finance Minister visited Washington
to inform United States Treasury officials that Mexico could not meet
its debt service obligations to commercial banks.62 Mexico, however,
was not alone in its difficulties. "By the end of the year," observed a
Congressional Joint Economic Committee Report, "it became clear
that Mexico was only one of nearly a dozen Latin American nations
that had borrowed considerably more from U.S., European, and Japa-
nese banks than their sluggish economies were capable of repaying on
time." Latin American debtor nations had a total external debt of more
than $318 billion, with yearly interest payments totalling $38.5 billion.
Their trade surplus, at the time, was $8.5 billion, or $30 billion less
than they needed merely to pay interest. The three largest Latin Amer-
ican debtors-Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico-suffered a particularly
dramatic deterioration in their debt servicing capacity. Brazilian debt
service (interest on short-term and long-term debt) as a percentage of
exports rose from thirty-six percent in 1973-1974 to eighty-seven per-
cent in 1982. The increase in the same time frame for Mexico was
from twenty-five to fifty-eight percent, and for Argentina, the deterio-
ration was even more marked. In 1973-1974, the ratio of debt service
Suppose someone comes along at some point and says well, we are not going to
pay them back. We just do not think it was imposed upon us reasonably, and
your rules are that you incur these obligations, and then over time we'll return
them all-well, we are not going to incur the cost within our society that that
implies, and we are just blowing the whistle on this whole system. Then where
are we? Is that an altogether implausible prospect?
Id.
61. Healey, supra note 57, at 66-7; Witteveen, supra note 54, at 33.
62. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing the Mexican Debt Crisis
of August 1982). Probably the best account of events immediately following the Mexi-
can default is to be found in J. KRAFT, THE MEXICAN RESCUE (1984).
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to exports was twenty-one percent, and in 1982 it was 103 percent.13
United States commercial banks were particularly at risk, as Sena-
tors Church, Javits, and Sarbanes had foreseen five years earlier. A
United States General Accounting Office Report summed up the vul-
nerability of the United States banks:
In June 1982, U.S. banks held LDC debt equal to 211 percent of U.S. bank
capital and LDC debt owed to the largest nine U.S. banks was 323 percent of
their capital. Debt owed by Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico to all U.S. banks
equalled 82 percent of the U.S. banks capital; debt owed by these three countries
to the largest nine U.S. banks equalled 116 percent of their capital."
The Mexican default in August 1982, demolished the optimistic as-
sessment of the effects of the recycling scheme as a means of managing
the financial imbalances that had arisen in the aftermath of the oil
price rises of 1973 and 1979.
PHASE II: 1982-1985
The full dimensions of the crisis, however, were not at first fully ap-
preciated. There were two distinguishing characteristics of this period:
first, there was widespread belief in credible circles that the financial
crisis resulting from the Mexican default was short-term in nature and
was likely to be resolved within an approximate eighteen month time
frame; and second, there was the conviction, particularly in United
States government circles, that the crisis afforded an opportunity to
bring the major debtor countries, especially of Latin America, back
into the fold of sound financial and economic management under the
aegis of the International Monetary Fund. 5 The World Bank and the
regional development banks were accorded a lesser role."o
63. Cline, Int'l Debt and the Stability of the World, Policy Analyses in Int'l Eco-
nomics, INST. FOR INT'L ECON. 17 (No. 4, Sept. 1983).
64. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 14.
65. See, e.g., Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for 1984:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Senate
Comm. on Appropriations, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 15 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Hear-
ings of Foreign Assistance] (statement of the Hon. George P. Schultz, Sec. of State)
(emphasizing the importance of the IMF). "The IMF is a critical part of the adjust-
ment process. The IMF helps affected countries develop sound policies of economic
stabilization. Such stabilization policies in turn encourage new commercial lending."
Id.
66. See Neikirk, The World Bank. Can It Overcome Barber Conable's Debacle?,
INTL ECON., 28 (Oct./Nov. 1987) (criticizing president Barber Conable and the
World Bank's perceived passivity over the debt crisis). The author writes, "during the
first few years of the debt crisis, Mr. Conable's predecessor, A.W. (Tom) Clausen,
stayed on the sidelines and permitted the International Monetary Fund to take the
leadership role." Id. at 30. This judgement may have been unfair to both Clausen and
Conable. In the early years of the debt crisis, 1982 to October 1985, the IMF was
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The Mexican crisis of August 1982 was resolved with an emergency
loan from the United States and American advance purchases of Mexi-
can oil for the American Strategic Petroleum Reserve. But United
States authorities who negotiated the rescue package also required
Mexico to agree with the IMF on an economic adjustment program
that would better balance its external accounts. Before concluding such
an agreement with Mexico, however, the then-Managing Director of
the Fund, Jacques de Larossiere, insisted that the private bank credi-
tors of Mexico agree to continued financing of Mexico's development."
An "involuntary" lending package was assembled to meet Mr. de
Larossiere's condition. 8 The pattern was established for dealing with
the other major debtor countries: first, an immediate United States res-
cue operation including a short-term credit (six months); second, a
commitment to seek an agreement with the Fund; and finally, involun-
tary continued lending by the private bank creditors linked to an agree-
ment between the debtor country and the Fund.6"
The economic adjustments advocated by the Fund differed in detail
for each country. The emphasis, however, was the same-to shift re-
sources from the domestic sector into activities which increased foreign
exchange earnings. This strategy meant production for export, a reduc-
tion in domestic expenditures and economic activity, and a devaluation
of the currency to spur exports. The reduction in domestic public ex-
penditures, in practice, translated into a decline in investment.70
encouraged to take the leadership, "but all that changed when the Treasury Secretary
James Baker unveiled his widely heralded Third World debt plan at the bank-fund
meeting in Seoul two years ago. The Baker Plan stressed economic growth over auster-
ity, and virtually invited the World Bank to take center-stage." Id.; see also Ipsen, The
Great $75 Billion Giveaway?, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Sept. 1988, at 318, 324 (not-
ing the belief of one Latin American investor that the World Bank is "best suited" to
deal with the debt problem); Integration of U.S. Policies on Trade, Exchange Rates,
and the Accumulated Debts of Less-Developed Countries: Hearings Before the Int'l
Trade Subcomm. of the Senate Fin. Comm. 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 70 (1986) (statement
of Prof. Jeffery D. Sachs, Dep't of Econ. Harvard Univ.) (stating "the strategy to date
has put the IMF in the front line of the debt crisis"). But see id. at 70 (statement of
Hon. James A. Baker III, Sec. of the Treasury) (giving equal billing to the World
Bank) Id.
67. Bad Debtor's Charter, THE ECON. Feb. 19, 1983, at 85. [hereinafter Bad
Debtor's Charter]; Bogdanowicz-Bindert, World Debt: The United States Reconsiders,
64 FOREIGN AFF. 259, 263 (Winter 1985/86); see supra note 38 and accompanying
text (describing the Mexican debt crisis of 1982).
68. Kuczynski, The Outlook for Latin American Debt, 66 FOREIGN AFF. 129, 131
(Fall 1987).
69. See Bad Debtor's Charter, supra note 67 at 286 (stating that the United States
agreed to rescheduling and/or increasing the loans); Kuczynski, supra note 68, at 131
(noting that to avoid defaults, commercial banks were forced to lend additional
money).
70. INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ECON. AND SOC. PROGRESS IN LATIN
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The more advanced developing countries such as Brazil, South Ko-
rea, Taiwan, and Mexico were relatively well positioned to execute the
IMF strategy for emphasizing export growth. The development strat-
egy of the past two decades had expanded industrial capacity, making
it more sophisticated.7 1 The increased availability of credit for this pur-
pose in the 1960s and the virtually unlimited funds to which the NICs
had access in the 1970s enabled them to expand their industrial base
without restraints from potential competitors in the industrialized
world.
Moreover, as the industrialized countries adjusted to the oil shock of
1973-1974 by deflating their economies, multinational corporations
looked with increasing interest on investments in the NICs, particularly
Brazil, Chile, Taiwan, and South Korea.7 2 Low wages, disciplined la-
bor, and financial incentives for foreign investors were attractive in-
ducements for new investments, particularly because the products man-
ufactured could be exported to markets in the industrialized world at
more competitive prices than domestic production in those markets. 3
Companies increased exports from Latin America to take advantage of
low cost production and to use capacity idled by economically de-
pressed local markets.7 4
These advantages were further maximized by the United States do-
mestic economic policy. The large tax cuts enacted by Congress in
1981, coupled with the increase in expenditures for the military budget,
far outweighed decreases in domestic nonmilitary spending.75 The re-
sult was a fiscal stimulus that propelled the American economy into
significant expansion in 1983 and 1984, far greater than that of Europe
AMERICA: EXTERNAL DEBT CRISIS AND ADJUSTMENT REP. 33-50 (1985). The Report
examines the process of macroeconomic adjustment of the seven largest Latin Ameri-
can economies to the abrupt curtailment of external lending in the post-1982 period
-Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. Id. Those coun-
tries produced almost 90 percent of the total output of goods and services of all Latin
America and Caribbean countries and owed a similar proportion of the total external
debt. Id. The Report concluded that there was a "decline in national savings and a
dramatic fall in the aggregate investment ratio for the seven countries from an average
of 24.1% of GNP in 1980-82 to 18.1% in 1983-84." Id. at 9; see also Fishlow, The
State of Latin American Economics, Economic and Social Progress in Latin America
133-37 (1985) (discussing critically the IMF model); Montagnon, IMF Criticized for
"Short-Term' Policies in Debtor Countries, Fin. Times, Sept. 16, 1985, at I (display-
ing a view more sympathetic to the IMF).
71. IMF ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 21.
72. COUNTERING WORLD DEFLATION, supra note 33, at 9.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. IMF ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 2, 6.
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and Japan.7 6 Interest rates in the United States remained high in his-
torical terms relative to inflation. These "real" interest rates attracted
huge capital flows from abroad, an attraction enhanced by the image of
the United States as the last best bastion of capitalism in the Western
world. The dollar, relative to other currencies, increased in value.77
This increase made imports cheaper in the United States, restraining
price increases by domestic United States producers. Imports increas-
ingly supplanted domestic production."
According to the IMF:
The U.S. recovery was of fundamental importance to countries seeking export-
led adjustment. U.S. imports from Asia and European developing countries in-
creased by some 80 percent between 1980 and 1984, with the growth being con-
centrated in 1983-84 ... Exporters of manufactures achieved remarkable suc-
cess, as U.S. imports from them doubled between 1980 and 1984.2
In contrast, other industrial countries' imports from these regions were
flat. s0 Virtually the entire increase in exports from Latin America be-
tween the first quarter of 1983 and the first quarter of 1985 went to the
United States.81
But the "strong" dollar also made it more difficult for American ex-
porters to sell their goods in foreign markets. In the NICs, these mar-
kets were already constrained by the economic austerity programs, al-
though these programs were fitfully implemented in many of the NICs.
Hence, the relative balance that had prevailed in the 1970s between
United States exports and imports to and from the NICs collapsed;
draconian austerity programs in the debtor countries, combined with
devalued currencies and reduced bank loans to those countries, trig-
gered a sharp decline in debtor country imports.82 United States ex-
ports to the Latin American region fell to $23 billion in 1983 from $39
billion in 1981, the year before the Mexican debt announcement. 8 In
1981, Latin American farm product imports totalled $6.9 billion or fif-
teen percent of all United States farm exports. Between 1982 and
1986, however, United States agricultural exports to Latin America de-
clined by one third, to $4.5 billion. As a result of the reduction in con-
sumption by the debtor countries, an estimated one million jobs have
76. Id.
77. Id. at 19.
78. COUNTERING WORLD DEFLATION, supra note 33, at 9.
79. IMF ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 21.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 19.
82. See COUNTERING WORLD DEFLATION, supra note 33, at 9.
83. MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST CO., WORLD FIN. MARKETS, LDC DEBT: DEBT
RELIEF OR MARKET SOLUTION? 10 (Sept. 1986).
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been lost in the United States.
With United States exports to the NICs (and more generally to the
developing world) falling, and imports from them soaring, the United
States merchandise trade deficit with the NICs grew precipitately. The
trade deficit with the East Asian NICs, such as South Korea, Taiwan,
Singapore, and Hong Kong increased from $4 billion in 1980 to $30
billion in 1986.4 In Latin America, the trade balance was substantially
improved by slashing imports and investment."
The developing countries as a whole succeeded in substantially re-
ducing their combined current account deficit from approximately $100
billion in 1982 to $44 billion in 1984. The aggregate deficit of the de-
veloping countries other than the Middle Eastern oil producers, includ-
ing the NICs, declined from $91 billion in 1981, equivalent to twenty-
three percent of exports of goods and services, to only $38 billion in
1984, nine percent of exports of goods and services.8 In effect, the
IMF-sponsored strategy had significant success in bringing about a re-
duction in the debtor countries' imbalances in their external accounts.
At the same time, however, there was a steep decline in private bank
financing of the debtor countries. As the IMF explained:
The decline in the developing countries' net borrowing from market sources was
the most dramatic financial development in 1981-84 ... the supply of new com-
mitments to borrowing countries from commercial sources virtually dried up.
Countries that relied predominantly on market sources for financing their exter-
nal position (the market borrowers) borrowed $125 billion (net) from banks and
other private creditors in 1981-82, but only $25 billion in 1983-84. Indeed, the
market borrowers, financing situation was even tighter than these figures suggest.
They secured net inflows from private creditors in 1983-84 only as a result of
obtaining some $23-24 billion in concerted lending packages related to debt
restructuring.
87
What this meant was that the debtor countries needed to use their
trade surpluses to finance their debt service obligations to the banks.
Brazil, for example, which achieved a $12 billion trade surplus in 1984,
84. MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST CO., WORLD FIN. MARKETS, THE ASIAN NICs
AND U.S. TRADE 6 (Jan. 1987).
85. MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST CO., WORLD FIN. MARKETS, THE BAKER INITIA-
TIVE: THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE BANKS 2 (Feb. 1986). In Argentina, capital formation
fell from an average of 25 percent of GNP in 1979-80, to 16 percent in 1985; in Brazil,
investment declined to 17 percent in 1982-85, whereas, it had achieved an average 27
percent in the 1970s; and in Mexico, investment which had grown at an average 28
percent in 1977-81 declined to a low of 22 percent in 1982-83. MORGAN GUARANTY
TRUST Co., WORLD FIN. MARKETS, GROWTH AND FINANCIAL MARKET REFORM IN
LATIN AMERICA, 2 (Apr./May 1986).
86. IMF ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 19.
87. Id. at 21-22.
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also had an interest bill to the private banks of $11 billion. The Latin
American countries in 1984 had a net transfer of $30 billion in debt
service payments to the private commercial banks; over the four year
period 1981-84, the net transfer of debt service payments from the
Latin American region to the private commercial banks was estimated
to have been approximately $100 billion.88
Yet as Leonard Silk of the New York Times remarked, the banks
have remained "remarkably calm," perhaps because they were not in
any great danger.89 Silk observed that the Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board, Paul A. Volcker, "told the American Bankers Associa-
tion conference in Honolulu . . . 'we have a strong safety net under our
own banking system, as do other leading countries.' -9 He enumerated
this safety feature as: (1) deposit insurance, and (2) an understanding
that the rules would change to protect the banks.
But there was no safety net under the factory worker displaced by
the loss of work resulting from the decline in export markets and the
competition from foreign imports. Not surprisingly, political pressures
grew within the United States for the protection of American jobs. The
December 1985 Morgan Guarantee World Financial Markets Report
aptly summed up the policy and its consequences: "[A]verage real
wage gains have been negligible in this recovery, maintaining their
stagnation of the last ten or more years." '' Foreign competition, it
noted, "has been the key factor. '92 The report added:
[T]his is not attributable solely to the higher dollar. The long run shift of com-
parative advantage in manufacturing to the NICs helped them penetrate the
U.S. domestic market even before the dollar's rise. U.S. manufacturers are
keenly aware of the cost savings attainable through contracting for production in
low wage areas abroad.9s
The 1982-85 debt strategy not only had a high cost for the American
88. Declaration of Montevideo, Dec. 18, 1985, at 3.
89. Silk, Economic Scene; Good Reasons To Lend More, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4,
1983, at Dl. Silk noted:
The financial markets in the United States and other Western countries have
been remarkably calm in the face of the international debt crisis. This may be
because the major banks, despite their heavy exposure in the debt-ridden devel-
oping countries, are not really in great jeopardy: they are protected by deposit
insurance, by the recognition of regulators that, if necessary, accounting rules
would be changed to protect them and by the expectation that their national
central banks would rescue major banks to protect the system.
Id.
90. Id. (quoting Paul A. Volcker, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board).





factory worker, but for the debtor countries as well, particularly in
Latin America. The December 1985 Montevideo Declaration of the
Foreign Ministers of the Latin American Group of countries that had
originally met in Cartagena, Colombia to discuss the debt crisis, ob-
served that, "in the last five years Latin America has regressed a dec-
ade." Malnutrition and infant mortality indices also increased. Invest-
ment in infrastructure and new production facilities dramatically
declined. Projects financed by the World Bank and the regional devel-
opment banks slowed to a halt as the debtor countries were unable to
put up their share of the funding.
When Alan Garcia was elected President of Peru in July 1985, he
announced that Peru would limit its payments to creditors to ten per-
cent of its export earnings. The other Latin American debtor countries
did not follow Peru's lead, but by the fall of 1985, it was becoming
evident that debt fatigue was taking hold in all of the debtor countries.
The private sector was not investing in new production facilities; the
public sector could not lead the way, both because it was too inefficient
and because it was constrained by agreements with the IMF and the
creditor countries. The combination of debt fatigue in the major debtor
countries and mounting political resistance in the United States to a
flood of imports from debtor countries desperate to earn the income to
pay the interest on their foreign indebtedness, created a sense of crisis
in Washington. Something vital had to be done. The result was the
Baker Initiative.
PHASE III: THE BAKER INITIATIVE
At the October 1985 annual meeting of the World Bank and the
IMF in Seoul, South Korea, Secretary of the Treasury James A. Baker
III proposed a new initiative for dealing with the economic malaise of
the major debtor countries in the developing world. The Secretary ex-
plicitly embraced the concept that economic growth was the best means
to overcome the depressing effects of the debt crisis in the debtor coun-
tries. 5 If not abandoning the austerity emphasis of the 1982-85 period,
he at least relegated it to a lesser priority. Baker proposed that addi-
tional resources be made available to those debtor countries that under-
took major economic policy reforms, with special emphasis on reducing
94. Declaration of Montevideo, Dec. 18, 1985, at 1.
95. Statement by the Hon. James A. Baker III, Secretary of the Treasury of the
United States before the Joint Annual Meeting of the Int'l Monetary Fund and the
World Bank, Oct. 8, 1985, Seoul, South Korea, reprinted in, UNITED STATES DEPART-
MENT oF TREASURY, TREASURY NEws at 4-5 (Oct. 8, 1985) [hereinafter Baker
Statement].
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the role of the public sector in the economy and liberalizing restrictions
on imports and foreign direct investment."
Under the plan, private commercial creditor banks would lend $20
billion of net additional resources (in excess of repayments of principal
and interest received from the debtor countries) over a three year pe-
riod to the countries undertaking such reforms. 7 The World Bank and
regional development banks would increase their disbursements to such
countries by fifty percent over existing levels.9 8 With respect to Latin
America, the Secretary observed that if the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank was to participate in such a program, it would need to make
major internal changes. 99
There was, however, no detailed explanation as to how private bank
lending was to be related to that of the multilateral development banks
(MDBs) (the World Bank and the regional development banks, the In-
ter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and
the African Development Bank). The explanation left many unan-
swered questions. Was there to be, as the private banks demanded,
joint disbursements, sharing of repayments, or mandatory cross de-
faults between the private and development bank loans so that a de-
fault against one became a default against the other? Who was to
make the judgment whether the commitments of the debtor countries
to policy reforms were sufficient to justify eligibility for Baker's Initia-
tive lending plan? Who was to monitor whether the commitments were
being fulfilled? How did the Baker Initiative lending differ from the
"involuntary" private bank IMF lending packages? Did it substitute
for them, or was it additional? Was all MDB lending to be related to
96. Id. The initiative Baker proposed included:
- increased reliance on the private sector, and less reliance on government, to
help increase employment, production and efficiency;
- supply-side actions to mobilize domestic savings and facilitate efficient invest-
ment, both domestic and foreign, by means of tax reform, labor market reform
and development of financial markets;
- market-opening measures to encourage foreign direct investment and capital
inflows, as well as to liberalize trade, including the reduction of export subsidies
market-oriented exchange rates, interest rates, wage and pricing policies to pro-
mote greater economic efficiency and responsiveness to growth and employment
opportunities; and
- sound monetary and fiscal policies focused on reducing domestic imbalances
and inflation and freeing up resources for the private sector.
Id. at 5-6.
97. Id. at 9.
98. MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST CO., WORLD FIN. MARKETS, LDC DEBT
REDUCTION: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 3-5 (Dec. 30, 1988) [hereinafter LDC DEBT
REDUCTION].
99. Baker Statement, supra note 95, at 9.
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the Baker Initiative? If a debtor country was ineligible for Baker Initi-
ative lending, was it still eligible for MDB loans? What was the "pre-
mium" attributable to the Baker Initiative (the lending by these insti-
tutions that would not have occurred if there had been no Baker Plan)?
There were no answers to these questions.
Even if there had been a plan, a basic problem would have remained.
The motive behind the Baker Initiative had been political: the backlash
building in the United States against the 1982-85 strategy and the fear
that in the debtor countries, the moderates who wanted to work within
the system were in danger of being overrun by more radical forces, who
wanted a break with the existing international financial order.100 This
concern argued for a rapid infusion of funding to alleviate the debt
service obligation of the debtor countries and to act as a stimulus to
economic growth.101 Such a stimulus, it was believed, would draw the
poison from the critique of the radicals.
This sense of political urgency, however, conflicted with the convic-
tion on the part of the Treasury staff that the debt crisis afforded an
unparalleled opportunity to achieve, in the debtor countries, the struc-
tural reforms favored by the Reagan Administration. The core of these
reforms was a commitment, on the part of the debtor countries, to re-
duce the role of the public sector as a vehicle for economic and social
development and rely more on market forces and private enterprise,
both domestic and foreign.
102
At the same time, Secretary Baker's call for increased net new lend-
ing to the debtor countries by the private commercial banks, loans in
excess of debtor country interest and principal repayments to the
banks, conflicted with the private banks' strategy of reducing their ex-
posure in the debtor countries. The resulting ambivalence of the banks
made their response to the Baker Initiative less than enthusiastic. The
Baker Plan did not result in the debtor countries "growing out" of the
debt crisis. During 1985-87, the seventeen most highly indebted coun-
tries that were to be the primary beneficiaries of the Baker Plan paid
$74 billion more than they received from private commercial banks and
multinational lending institutions.0 3 Between September 1985 and
100. See Broad, How About a Real Solution to Third World Debt?, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 28, 1987, at A25 (noting that the new coalitions organized to demand drastic
reductions in debt service received wide support from the Philippines to Argentina).
101. See id. (stating that the Baker Plan proposed significant new lending to the
fifteen most indebted countries).
102. See Baker Press Release, supra note 95, at 5 (calling for decreased reliance on
the public sector and increased use of the private sector).
103. See THE WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at xiv, x-xix (listing the 17 highly in-
debted countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ivory
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September 1987, American banks cut their overall loans to fifteen
countries, which were the original object of the Baker Plan, by twelve
percent from $91 to $80 billion.104 Per capita income in these countries
has declined practically every year since 1980.105
An impasse between the United States and the major Latin Ameri-
can member countries of the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB), the largest and oldest regional development bank, prevented the
bank from playing a major role in the region's development. The
Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB
Charter) had been signed by the United States and nineteen Latin
American states as a part of the Alliance for Progress program initi-
ated by President John F. Kennedy. 06
The impasse concerned the demands by the United States, in part
supported by Canada and the nonregional member countries of the
IDB, for a more effective role in decision making in the Bank. Unlike
other multilateral institutions, the borrowing member countries of the
IDB own a majority of the voting shares.'0 Decisions, unless specifi-
cally stated otherwise, are made by a majority of the total voting
power.'0 8 By voting as a block, the borrowing member countries could
Coast, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Uruguay, Ven-
ezuela, and Yugoslavia). Jamaica and Ecuador were later added to the original Baker
15. Id.
104. Id. at xxi.
105. See id. at xiii (listing economic indicators from 1980-87).
106. Discureso pronunciado por el Presidente de los Estados Unidos, John Fitz-
gerald Kennedy, en Sesion Protocolar del Consejo de law Organizacion de los Estados
Americanos, el 14 de abril de 1961, para celebrar el Dia de las Americas.
Interestingly, an agreement to establish such an institution had been reached by the
Eisenhower Administration. It thus represented a bipartisan initiative in the United
States. Cuba was the only one of the Latin American states that did not sign the Char-
ter. Later, several English speaking Caribbean countries that gained their indepen-
dence became members of the Bank. In the 1970s, a number of Western European
countries and Japan also became members of the IDB; see J. LEVINSON AND J. DE
ONis, THE ALLIANCE THAT LOST ITS WAY, A TwENTIETH CENTURY FUND STUDY 36-
45 (1970) (discussing the background to the promotion of the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank); INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, GENERAL RULES GOVERNING
ADMISSION OF NONREGIONAL COUNTRIES TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE BANK (1976) (list-
ing the nonregional member countries of the IDB: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ger-
many, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, United King-
dom, and Yugoslavia).
107. See Agreement Establishing the Inter-American Development Bank, Inter-
American Development Bank, December 30, 1959, art. viii, § 4(a), 10 U.S.T. 3029,
3054, T.I.A.S. No. 4397, at 14, 389 U.N.T.S. 69, iii (stating that regional developing
member countries under the Charter are entitled to 53.5% of the voting shares; the
United States holds 34.5 % of the shares of the Bank; Canada is entitled to 4 % and the
remainder is held by the nonregional member countries).
108. See id. art. viii, § 4(c)(iii), at 3090. Amendments to the Charter required a
majority of the total number of governors, including two thirds of the governors of
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theoretically approve individual loans and technical assistance. There
were, however, limits to this power. For example, a quorum is neces-
sary for all meetings of the Board of Executive Directors requiring an
absolute majority of the total number of Directors, including an abso-
lute majority of directors of regional members, representing not less
than two-thirds of the total voting power of the members.109 As the
United States represented 34.5 percent of the voting power, the ab-
sence of the United States Director could effectively prevent the pas-
sage of any proposal by preventing a quorum.
This power was rarely used, however. Decisions in the Board of Ex-
ecutive Directors were by and large achieved by consensus. Neverthe-
less, the United States Treasury Department, which has responsibility
for participation of the United States in the multilateral institutions,
sought to exercise greater influence over the design of loan and techni-
cal assistance proposals.110 It sought to amend the Rules of the Board
of Executive Directors to permit two directors to delay a loan or techni-
cal assistance proposal for an extended period of time.
Borrowing member countries perceived this proposal as constituting
a de facto North American veto because they assumed that Canada
would almost invariably vote with the United States. 1 The negotia-
regional member countries of the Bank representing not less than three fourths of the
total voting power of the member countries; see also id. art. xii (a), at 3090.
109. Id. art. viii, § 3(f), at 3090.
110. Fidler, IADB Seeking a New Role After the Lost Years, Fin. Times, Mar. 16,
1989, at 6. "The essence of the dispute was the dissatisfaction of the Reagan Adminis-
tration with the bank's operations and lending policies." Id.
111. Fidler, IADB Capital Increase Smoothes Way on Loans, Fin. Times, Mar. 17,
1989, at 6. The article describes the compromise formula on voting which led to a
break in the deadlock:
The IADB has a 12-strong board. The agreed formula gives the right to delay
loans to one director for two months; two directors, five months; and three direc-
tors, 12 months. The U.S. and Canada have one director each; the European
countries two directors; and Latin American states eight. The Bank's president
would have power to vote some loans not subject to delay.
Id. The article noted that, "the way has been cleared for a Dollars 22.5b capital in-
crease for the Inter-American Development Bank. Clearance follows resolution of a
three-year-long, often acrimonious dispute between the U.S. and Latin American
shareholders." Id.; see also Inter-American Bank Could I3in Big Role in New LDC
Debt Plan, J. Com., Mar. 16, 1989, at 7A. The agreement in principle at the Amster-
dam meeting needed to be ratified through a formal vote of Government authorities in
favor of the resolutions authorizing the increase in resources. Funding in the form of
capital increases and direct appropriations for the Fund for Special Operations of the
Bank, which makes loans on highly concessional terms to borrowers, required parlia-
mentary and congressional approval. Hence, the resources increase and the increased
lending program was not expected to be effective before calendar year 1990. Fidler
makes a common error in reporting the $22.5b as the capital increase. In fact, the
$22.5b figure refers to the projected lending program for the four year period 1990-94,
which required a capital increase of $26.5 billion. The difference is accounted for by
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tions over an increase of resources deadlocked for four years.11 2 Not
until the Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the IDB in
March 1989, was the impasse resolved. The Governors reached a com-
promise agreement on an increase in resources that would permit a
lending program of $22.5 billion over the four year period 1990-1994.
Additionally, the Governors agreed upon a procedure in which the
Board of Executive Directors of the IDB would amend the rules of pro-
cedure of that body to permit a substantial delay for a maximum pe-
riod of one year, in discussion on an agenda item if the requisite num-
ber of Executive Directors objected to the consideration of the item.
The United States Acting Governor at the meeting further proposed
that the IDB engage in sector lending, a form of quick disbursing lend-
ing conditioned on changes in policy by the debtor country, only in
conjunction with the World Bank. The Governors agreed that at the
end of two years, they would review the situation to determine whether
the IDB should engage in such lending without the need to do so jointly
with the World Bank. In 1988, the IDB loan authorizations declined to
the lowest level in five years.113 Instead of contributing to the Baker
Initiative, the region's development bank could not play a significant
role.
the fact that the lending program is partially financed by repayments of previous loans,
estimated cancellations and a balance carried over from the previous (Sixth) Replen-
ishment, all of which totalled (for the capital resources of the Bank) an estimated $8.1
billion. The balance was then obtained by the $26.5 billion capital increase. Only 2.5
percent of the capital increase ($661 million) is paid-in, the remainder is callable or a
form of guarantee by the member countries to make such capital available if necessary
to meet the obligations of the Bank to creditors (after drawing upon Bank reserves).
However, not all of the callable capital is recognized in the capital markets as a basis
for Bank borrowing in such markets. Only the callable capital subscriptions of the
Bank's nonborrowing member countries are recognized in the financial markets as a
basis for the Bank borrowings in those markets. The borrowed funds are then used to
fund disbursements of the loans extended by the Bank to borrowing member countries
to import goods and services for development purposes. Hence, of a total capital sub-
scription of $26.5 billion, $12.5 billion or approximately 48 percent is "usable."
112. See Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations for Fiscal
Year 1988: Hearings on H.R. 3186 Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations of the
Senate Comm. on Appropriations, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 69 (1987) [hereinafter 1987
Hearings on H.R. 3186] (statement of James W. Conrow, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Developing Nations, Dep't of Treasury); see also Future Role of the Inter-Amer-
can Development Bank: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Dev. Institutions and
Fin. of the Comm. on Banking, Fin. and Urban Aff., House of Representatives, on the
Future Role of the Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-25 (1988) [herein-
after 1988 Hearings on Int'l Dev.] (statements of R. Sternfeld, Former Exec. Vice-
President of the Inter-American Development Bank); Making Foreign Aid Work,
Wash. Post, Mar. 27, 1987, at A26 (discussing foreign aid and giving a critical com-
ment on the position of the Treasury in the IDB negotiations); Mistake at Treasury, J.
Com., Apr. 27, 1987, at 16A.
113. INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ANNUAL REPORT 1988 at V.
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The Baker Seoul speech succeeded in its primary objective: the
Baker Plan became the agenda for overcoming the debt crisis.
Whatever its original motivation, the Baker Plan can be understood as
a rather eclectic attempt to synthesize the development experience of
the past three decades. The Plan took the development priorities of the
1950s-emphasis upon the role of the private sector, and foreign direct
investment-repackaged them, and presented them as a new departure.
It adapted the 1960s Alliance for Progress concept of country program-
ming and policy reform, substituting for the social reform content of
the Alliance period the classic American conservative themes of in-
creasing efficiency and reliance on market forces. The Plan built upon
the development financing role of the private credit markets that
evolved in the 1970s by more directly linking that financing to the lend-
ing of the IMF and the MDBs. Above all, by tying the debtor country
access to capital for development purposes to fidelity to a single eco-
nomic development model that enhanced the role of market forces and
private enterprise, Secretary Baker created the impression that what he
sought was a return to the conditions that had prevailed three decades
earlier in the 1950s when access to capital for development purposes
depended upon adherence to IMF and World Bank guidelines.
PHASE IV: NEW INITIATIVES
Three and a half years later, there is new interest in more compre-
hensive approaches to the debt problem. Indeed, the first such sug-
gested approach was articulated by United States Senator Bill Bradley.
In a June 1986 speech, Bradley suggested that some part of the debt
would need to be gradually written off, but that this should be done
only for those countries that agreed to satisfactory economic and social
reform programs."1 Bradley's statement that private commercial banks
would have to forgive part of the debt was considered a radical propo-
sal. In other respects, however, Bradley's approach was quite conven-
tional and consistent with the Baker Plan's emphasis upon the case-by-
case approach. It explicitly embraced the concept of conditioning debt
relief upon commitments by the debtor country to policy reform, al-
though Bradley gave greater importance than did Secretary Baker to
social equity as a part of the necessary reforms. The details of Senator
Bradley's plan were less important than the fact that he enlarged the
agenda for discussion of possible alternatives to dealing with the debt
114. Address by Senator Bill Bradley, A Proposal for Third World Debt Manage-
ment (June 29, 1986).
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crisis beyond the Baker Plan. Bradley could do this because he was
respected as an expert on economic issues both in the press and in
Congress.
Initially, Bradley was an isolated voice. More recently, however,
there has emerged a plethora of proposals for more comprehensive debt
relief. Three factors appear to have led to this development. First, the
May 1987 announcement by John Reed, Chief Executive Officer of
Citicorp, that Citicorp was adding $3 billion to its loan loss reserves as
a contingency against third world debt risks, and The Bank of Boston's
action later in the same year to actually take losses on specific loans to
debtor countries, amounted to an open admission by creditor banks that
some part of the debt was not repayable.115 With most of the major
banks in some degree following Citicorp's lead, although stopping short
of the Bank of Boston's actions, the concept of debt forgiveness ap-
peared to have gained a degree of legitimacy in political circles in
Washington.'
The second factor that led to a search for alternatives to the Baker
plan was the failure of the debtor countries to achieve sustained eco-
nomic growth under the aegis of the Baker Plan, and the continued
reluctance of the private commercial banks to lend new money aside
from that associated with restructuring designed to assure the contin-
ued flow of interest payments. Moeen A. Quereshi, Senior Vice Presi-
dent of the World Bank, summed up the economic problem: "[i]nstead
of growing at four to five percent per year-which was the average rate
of growth we had expected was necessary-the countries overall have
grown at less than one half that rate."" 7 The Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank observed that the region's 1987 economic performance was
disappointing: "[e]conomic growth reached 2.6 percent, only margin-
ally higher than the population increase of 2.2 percent. . . . In nearly
all the countries, per capita GDP in 1987 was lower than in 1980."
One year later, J.P. Morgan, generally sympathetic to the Baker Plan,
summed up the balance for the debtor countries:
115. See Truell, Citicorp's Reed Takes Firm Stance on Third World Debt, Wall
St. J., Feb. 4, 1987, at 6 (stating that John Reed, Chairman of Citicorp, decided to
halt the trend in making more concessions to debt-burdened nations).
116. See Pine, U.S. Policymakers Fear Citicorp Stance on Debtor Nations Imper-
ils Global Plan, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1987, at 5 (noting that U.S. policy makers ex-
pressed concern that Citicorp's hard line stance may threaten global debt strategy);
Bartlett, Big Banks Shift From Third World, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1988, at DI (stat-
ing that thirteen of the largest U.S. banks reduced their portfolio of troubled loans to
third world countries).
117. Rowan, Third World Debt has Nations Looking for Creative Answers, Wash.
Post, Mar. 20, 1988, at H4.
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Despite repeated attempts to bring down inflation, most of the debtors have had
little enduring success. Nor are the debtors growing out of their problems: by
and large, their economic growth has remained quite inadequate for basic needs.
Financial support from foreign private and official creditors has not measured up
to the goals of the Baker initiative. Confidence has yet to return and, on balance,
flight capital has not been repatriated. 1 8
Finally, there has appeared to be a growing realization that a resolu-
tion of the United States trade deficit may be linked to the economic
recovery of the debtor nations, particularly in Latin America."'9 A re-
cent report of the Overseas Development Council observes that, "the
economic welfare of the United States is inextricably linked to develop-
ments in the global economy and in the developing countries."' 20 Fu-
eled by these developments, a lively debate has broken out in Washing-
ton. Secretary Baker, supported by Paul Volcker, former Chairman of
the Federal Reserve Board, contends that there is no alternative to the
Baker Plan. 21 Others, including members of the United States Con-
gress, contend that there must be an alternative to the Baker Plan.
The most comprehensive legislative initiative on Third World debt is
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.11 The two bills
later merged into the Act were House Bill 3, titled "Trade and Interna-
tional Economic Policy Reform Act of 19871123 and Senate Bill 1420,
118. LDC DEBT REDUCTION, supra note 98, at 1.
119. See Address by J. Robinson III, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of
American Express Co., A Comprehensive Agenda for LDC Debt and World Trade
Growth, before the Overseas Development Council at 1, 7 (Feb. 29, 1988) (listing ef-
fect of LDC debt on the United States trade deficit); OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT COUN-
CIL, U.S. POLICY AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: AGENDA 1988, GROWTH, Ex-
PORTS, AND JOBS IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY, at 6, 10 [hereinafter AGENDA
1988].
120. AGENDA 1988, supra note 119, at 4. More specifically, notes the report:
The negative impact of the economic downturn in the developing countries on the
U.S. economy was direct and measurable: U.S. exports to all developing coun-
tries dropped from $88 billion in 1980 to $77 billion in 1985. If exports had
grown in the first half of this decade at the same rate as in the 1970s, they would
have totalled about $150 billion in current dollars. The impact on employment
also was dramatic. The actual and potential employment loss (if exports had
grown as they did in the 1970s) amounted to 1.7 million jobs-or nearly 21% of
total official unemployment in 1986.
Id. at 10.
121. See Rauch, Why Hill's Debt Hawks Are So Ruffled, Nat'l J., Mar. 12, 1988,
at 683 (noting Volcker's support of the Administration's plan-that to push the banks
would be counterproductive).
122. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
102 Stat. 1107; Bruce A. Morrison, Member of Congress, Third World Debt Legisla-
tive Report: Int'l Debt Management Authority at I (June 6, 1988) (noting the bill's
importance).
123. H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1988).
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titled the "Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1987. ' '124 This
initiative had its antecedents in proposals made as far back as 1986.128
As approved in May 1988 by the House Banking Committee, the key
provision of the Act is the establishment of an international debt ad-
justment facility that would: (a) purchase sovereign loans at a discount,
passing along the benefits of such discount to the corresponding debtor
country, (b) encourage developed countries with capital surpluses to in-
vest these in debtor countries, and (c) assist creditor banks in volunta-
rily disposing of sovereign loans in the private sector.126 One of the
goals of the Act is a genuine reduction in the debt servicing burden
stifling growth in the developing world.127 Debtor countries would ask
the facility to purchase some of its debt and present a plan for "future
economic management of the country." Once a debt discount and
amount to be purchased were established, the facility would make of-
fers to the debt holders and would purchase any loans tendered by us-
ing funds which it had raised itself in private credit markets. Any bor-
rowing by the facility would be backed either by the commitments of
developed nations or the IMF's gold reserve. The facility, in its new
role as creditor, would then further seek to reduce the debtor's burden
on the discounted debt, by engaging in debt restructuring such as debt
for equity swaps, debt buy-backs by the debtor at the discounted price
paid by the facility, or long-term securitization of debt with a contin-
gent claim on some key debtor export at a specified price. As a result of
the Act, capital surplus countries such as Japan and Germany are en-
couraged to provide more support for the facility than other participat-
ing countries.
The initiative further calls for the analysis of existing regulatory im-
pediments to negotiated reductions in sovereign debt obligations12 8 and
to the sale of such debt at a discount in secondary markets, as well as
possible changes to current reserve requirements.129 Significantly, there
124. S. 1420, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1988).
125. Congressmen John J. LaFalce and Bruce A. Morrison most clearly articulated
the proposal in H.R. 1423, and H.R. 1453, respectively. H.R. 1423, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1988); H.R. 1453, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1988); see News from Congressman
John J. LaFalce, LaFalce Unveils Major Legislative Initiative to Confront Third
World Debt Crisis (Mar. 5, 1987); News from Congressman John J. Lafalce, Action
Needed on Third World Debt (Mar. 16, 1987); Bruce A. Morrison, Member of Con-
gress, Third World Debt Legislative Report: Int'l Debt Management Authority (Sept.
25, 1987).
126. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§ 3111(a)(3)(A)-(C), 102 Stat. 1107, 1377 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 5331).
127. Id. § 3103(2), at 1376 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 5323).
128. Id. § 3122(a)-(b), at 1380-81 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3912).
129. Id. § 3122(b), at 1380-81.
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is also a statement of Congressional intent that bank regulators should
provide "maximum flexibility" to encourage negotiated reductions in
principal and interest obligations. The legislation also tackles the prob-
lem of capital flight, by requesting further studies on possible solutions,
for example, how countries which serve as "resting places" for such
capital might help debtor countries to identify its sources. There are
also requests for various additional studies on such subjects as the im-
pact of past IMF austerity policies on debtor nations and how to mobil-
ize greater private capital for developing nations.
The Omnibus Trade Bill was voted out of the Conference Commit-
tee.130 The Senate trade bill was generally compatible with the House
bill although the compromises were closer to the Senate bill. 31 The
proposals regarding the facility were essentially the same, calling upon
the Secretary of the Treasury to explore negotiations with other devel-
oped countries for its creation.1 32 The Senate version, however, pro-
vided that the Secretary could decline to enter such negotiations if he
should make a finding that to do so would: "(A) result in a material
increase in the discount at which sovereign debt is sold, (B) materially
increase the probability of default on such debt, or (C) materially en-
hance the likelihood of debt service failure or disruption."1 33 A provi-
sion from the Conference bill that became part of the Act requires the
Treasury to submit a progress report six months and twelve months
from the date the Act became law.134 The most restrictive part of the
Senate bill incorporated into the Conference proposal, and finally the
Act itself is a provision that prohibits such a facility from requiring any
financial backing from the United States Government. 3 '
Another comprehensive approach to the problem was unveiled by
American Express Company Chairman and CEO James D. Robinson,
III at a speech before the Overseas Development Council."30 Similar to
130. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
Stat. 1107 (to be codified in scattered titles and sections of U.S.C.).
131. See generally H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100 Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in
1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1547 (paralleling the provisions of the House
bill with the Senate Amendments to it).
132. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§ 3111(a)(2), 102 Stat. 1107, 1376 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 5331).
133. Id. § 3111(a)(2)(A)-(C), at 1376.
134. Id. § 3111 (c), at 1377-78. In light of the Treasury's opposition to such a facil-
ity, it is unlikely that such report will be encouraging.
135. Id. § 3112(a), at 1376-77. The Congress, however, can expressly vote to con-
tribute to the IDMA. Id.
136. Speech by James D. Robinson, III, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer,
American Express Company, A Comprehensive Agenda for LDC debt and World
Trade Growth, before the Overseas Development Council (Feb. 28, 1988) [hereinafter
Robinson Speech]; see also Robinson, "Radical Relief," Wash. Post, Mar. 15, 1988, at
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
the legislative initiative described above, the proposal, in Robinson's
words, would serve as a "comprehensive approach to deal with the ma-
jor imbalances and present realities. 137 Robinson proposed the crea-
tion of a new international agency that would purchase sovereign debt
of debtor countries at a negotiated discount, 138 conditioned on adher-
ence to an agreed economic adjustment program. In exchange, Robin-
son's so-called Institute of International Debt and Development (12D2)
would issue interest-bearing, long-term bonds and participating pre-
ferred stock to the banks.' The governments of major developed coun-
tries would sponsor the Institute, which would constitute a joint venture
of the World Bank and the Fund.1 40 The sponsoring governments would
provide the initial capital of the Institute, either directly by call or
through other unspecified arrangements. The World Bank and the IMF
must agree to any other arrangements.' 4 ' Robinson expects its obliga-
tions to receive the highest credit ratings as a result of the "contingent
commitments of the sponsoring country governments," i.e., the major
developed countries. 42 The Institute would subordinate debt it pur-
chased to all new debt in the future, 4 3 as long as the economic adjust-
ment program agreed to with the debtor country remains in place.1
44
This would presumably encourage new lending, as any new loans would
have a prior claim on debtor country resources over debt that the Insti-
tute purchased and owned.
As expected, the proposal came under severe criticism from those
who advocate a continuation of the "muddle through" approach ex-
isting so far. Secretary Baker has complained that the scheme "puts
the solution squarely on the backs of the taxpayers in the creditor
countries." Clearly, the proposal would create unknown costs for major
developed countries that serve as sponsoring governments. Critics fur-
ther point out that, (a) banks would be taking losses on their invest-
ments, and (b) it is difficult to understand why a debtor country that
politically cannot deal with creditor banks or with policies imposed
upon it by IMF would find it easier to deal with a behemoth Institute
such as the one envisioned by Robinson. On the other hand, as Robin-
son points out, under the comprehensive approach of the proposal, ev-
A23 (outlining his proposal for addressing world debt).
137. Robinson Speech, supra note 136, at 12.
138. Id. at 15, point 5.
139. Id. at 15, point 5.
140. Id. at 14, point 1.
141. Id. at 14, point 3.
142. Id. at 15, point 5.
143. Id. at 15, point 7.
144. Id. at 16, point 8.
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eryone shares the burden and everyone reaps the benefits.14 5 The par-
ticipating countries receive debt relief, if they agree to and continue to
implement sound economic policies. The banks get high grade paper in
exchange for their low grade loans. Lastly, Robinson emphasizes that
developed countries contribute to the soundness of the global economy
and financial system and the opening of markets that have been closed
in recent years. 46
Like the Baker and Bradley Plans, both the LaFalce/Morrison and
Robinson schemes emphasize the need for agreed economic policy re-
forms in the debtor countries. Whatever the differences among them,
there appears to be a broad consensus linking additional lending
(Baker) or debt relief (Bradley, LaFalce/Morrison, Robinson) to policy
reform within the debtor countries. An interesting variation of this
theme has been proposed by Congressman Donald Pease. He would in-
troduce a two-tier concept of conditionality, the first tier being balance
of payments targets. Only if these targets were not met for two consec-
utive years, would more detailed policy conditions enter into discussion.
Congressman Pease would locate a proposed debt purchase facility in
the IMF rather than the World Bank as proposed by Robinson and
LaFalce/Morrison.
Moeen A. Quereshi, Senior Vice President of Operations at the
World Bank, expressed skepticism as to the political willingness of the
industrialized countries to support a debt facility such as the one rec-
ommended by Robinson and Congressional critics of the Baker Plan.
Instead, Quereshi outlined a six-point agenda for further development
of the international debt strategy: "an emphasis on investment [in
debtor countries], explicit medium term financing plans, an expanded
role for official lenders in financing new investment, greater differentia-
tion among countries, broadened efforts to reduce debt, and greater
regulatory flexibility ....
The Institute of International Finance, spokesman for the major
banks engaged in international lending, argued the case against
mandatory debt reduction by the major commercial banks, noting that
"[m]andatory debt forgiveness deals with the symptoms, not the
145. Id. at 3.
146. Id. at 8.
147. Remarks by Moeen A. Quereshi, Sr. Vice President of Operations at the
World Bank, Six Principles for a Revitalized Debt Strategy 11-19 (prepared for deliv-
ery to All Party Parliamentary Group on Overseas Development Conference on "Grow-
ing Out of Debt-The European Contribution") (London, Dec. 6, 1988) [hereinafter
Quereshi Remarks].
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causes." 148
Other commentators, however, view generalized debt reduction by
the commercial banks as desirable and inevitable. Hobart Rowan, eco-
nomics editor of the Washington Post observed:
Slowly but surely, seven long years after the crisis broke out in 1982, the richer
world is moving toward the reduction of the huge debt that is hanging over and
crippling many nations in the poorer Third World. . . .There is an unspoken
acknowledgement that much of the $250 billion owed by major Latin debtor
countries to the commercial banks is never going to be paid off.1"
In hearings before the House Banking Committee on International
Economic Conditions, William Seidman, Chairman of the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) testified that, "it is the FDIC's
conclusion that the LDC debt situation poses no immediate discernible
threat to the FDIC. The FDIC fund is affected only if insured banks
fail. At this time, although this is a serious problem and may affect
bank profits, failures due to LDC debt are not likely." 150 The money
148. THE INST. OF INT'L FIN., THE WAY FORWARD FOR MIDDLE INCOME COUN-
TRIES 19 (Jan. 1989). The Institute continued:
Banks do not believe that mandatory debt forgiveness would be in the interests of
the Baker Plan countries. It would be self-defeating since it would choke off the
future capital flows from private sources which are absolutely crucial to growth
and development in the middle income countries. There is a moral hazard be-
cause bad performance would be rewarded. Mandatory debt forgiveness deals
with the symptoms, not the causes. It might well result in a relaxation of finan-
cial discipline, which could only delay the needed policy changes. And without
changes in policy, debtor countries soon will be unable to service any future obli-
gations that they might hope to attract. Thus, no lasting solution can be achieved
through debt forgiveness; indeed, debt forgiveness seems likely to ensure that
middle-income countries will become the wards of taxpayers in the industrial
countries, dependent upon them for foreign aid and competing with the poorest
countries for the meager amounts of aid that are available.
Id.; see also Quereshi Remarks, supra note 147, at 11-19 (discussing the six points in
depth).
149. Rowan, Richer Nations Moving Toward Cutting Debt, Wash. Post, Feb. 12,
1989, at HI.
150. International Economic Conditions, U.S. Financial System Exposure to LDC
Debt Crisis (panel 2): Hearings Before the House Banking Comm., 101 Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989) (testimony of W. Seidman, Chairman Fed. Deposit Insur. Corp.) re-
printed in (NEXIS, Fed. News Serv. at 5). Seidman observed:
With respect to the exposure of U.S. banks to the LDC debt, it is concentrated
in the nine money center banks. . . .Since 1982, when this problem gained gen-
eral attention, the nine money center banks have been successful in building their
primary capital to a level which allowed them to withstand any likely events in
the LDC areas. In December 1983, these nine banks had aggregate exposure to
the 31 LDC countries of $61 billion. This was an amount neqrly twice their
aggregate primary capital of $32 billion. As of June 30, 1988, however, the same
nine banks had increased their combined primary capital to $65 billion. And thus
at this point, their LDC debt exposure of roughly $55 billion total less than 85
percent of their aggregate capital.
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center banks, then, were in a position to participate in a debt reduction
program without severe detrimental financial consequences to them-
selves. At the same time, they were in a stronger position to negotiate
with the debtor countries than they had been in the early years of the
debt crisis. As Alan Riding of the New York Times put it, "debtor
nations have been outmaneuvered." 151 Henry Kissinger summed up the
financial result in stark terms: "Since the end of 1982 Latin America
has paid around $235 billion in interest, but its indebtedness has in-
creased by $50 billion. Latin America, an underdeveloped region, has
become a net exporter of capital." '152
The tentative nature of the debate surrounding the debt issue is re-
flected in the regulatory, accounting, and tax thicket. Loans to develop-
ing countries can be quite profitable for the banks, creating an incen-
tive for the Banks to stay in the lending game to the debtor countries.
The degree of profitability, however, may depend upon the tax status of
the individual bank. For example, where a debtor country uses a gross-
up method for computing the income tax theoretically withheld on in-
terest income earned by the Bank in the debtor country, the Bank is
allowed a foreign tax credit under the United States Internal Revenue
Code, although the full amount of the tax may not have been actually
paid in the debtor country. 53 But the value of the foreign tax credit
depends upon whether the Bank has sufficient foreign source income
against which it can use the foreign tax credit earned in the debtor
country.154 For those banks that do not have such foreign source in-
come, interest received on outstanding loans from debtor countries is
Id. at 5-6.
151. Riding, It's the Decade of Unsupportable Debt, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1988, at
2. He continued:
When the crisis was at its height, they were encouraged to be "responsible". If
they kept up interest payments and accepted austerity imposed by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, their "cash flow" problems would soon ease and capital
markets would reopen to them .... So year after year, in the name of rebuild-
ing their credit rating, countries that "imported" capital to grow paid out more
in interest than they received in fresh credit. Conversely, while having to accept
constant rescheduling of principal payments, commercial banks continued to earn
good interest on their loans. By the time this arrangement was challenged last
year, big debtors had lost their chance to change the rules, and the informal
cartel of banks, Western governments and international financing institutions
had seized the initiative.
Id.
152. Kissinger, First a Breakthrough with Mexico, Wash. Post, Jan. 11, 1989, at
A21.
153. See Intl Debt, supra note 13, at 21 (statement of Sen. Frank Church) (noting
that Brazil is the example most cited for the arithmetical details of how this worked for
the private commercial banks).
154. Id. at 19-21.
19891
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
increasingly being used to pay down the loans-and, thus, get out of
the business of lending further money to the debtor countries.1
The tax status of an individual bank may be a determining factor as
to whether it stays in the game. In 1986, however, Congress manifested
its belief that the foreign tax credit regime had resulted in significant
inequities, even abuses, by the Banks.158 Congress, therefore, provided
for a phase out of the provisions as they had previously existed.
15 7 It
ameliorated the severity of this decision by exempting for a limited
time thirty-four of the debtor countries. This allowed the banks to
claim foreign tax credits for income taxes paid in those countries, al-
though such credits could only offset foreign source income of the
banks.
The situation is further complicated by new capital adequacy rules
designed to achieve a common standard for measuring banks' capital
adequacy on the basis of the degree of risk assigned to its asset base.
The proposal establishes a framework that: (1) makes regulatory capi-
tal requirements more sensitive to differences in risk profiles among
banking organizations; (2) takes off-balance sheet exposures into ex-
plicit account in assessing capital adequacy; and (3) minimizes disin-
centives to holding liquid, low-risk assets. The critical recommendation
of both proposals is to relate capital adequacy to risk-weighted assets
held by the Banks. The target proposed is that by 1992 the standard
ratio of capital to weighted risk assets should be eight percent. Of that,
155. See LDC DEBT REDUCTION, supra note 98, at 2 (noting "[a]fter six years of
involuntary lending and no assurance of eventual repayment at full value, few commer-
cial banks are interested in further increasing their exposure to troubled debtors"); see
also REPORT OF THE THIRD WORLD DEBT PANEL OF THE ECONOMIC POLICY COUNCIL
OF UNA-USA, THIRD WORLD DEBT: A REEXAMINATION OF LONG-TERM MANAGE-
MENT 22 (Sept. 7, 1988).
156. See Int'l Debt, supra note 13, at 19-21. The Senate Report noted:
For example, let us suppose that Citibank's branch in London has shown a profit
of $1 million in 1977; the same year, its branch in the Bahamas has also shown a
$1 million profit. Citibank would have to pay a 52 percent tax or $520,000 on its
London income to the U.K. Treasury; it would have to pay zero tax to the Baha-
mas government on its Nassau branch earnings because the Bahamas have no
corporate income tax. Since Citibank is a U.S. corporation, it would also owe a
nominal 48 percent tax on its consolidated foreign earnings, to the U.S. Trea-
sury, i.e., $960,000 of $2 million in earnings. However, because of the foreign tax
credit, it can offset dollar for dollar all the taxes it paid to the U.K. government,
up to 48 percent on its London branch earnings, and credit the remaining four
percent, paid to the U.K. Treasury against the U.S. taxes owed on its Bahamas
income, on which it had in fact paid no foreign income tax. It thus gets an addi-
tional $40,000 credit against U.S. taxes. The result is that Citicorp in fact owes
the U.S. Treasury only $440,000 on its $2,000,000 in overseas earnings.
Id. at 19.




the core capital elements-equity and retained earnings-should be at
least four percent. 158
Loan loss reserves, however, will no longer be eligible for inclusion as
part of a Bank's primary or core capital for purposes of the capital
adequacy test. Moreover, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) will no
longer allow Banks to anticipate loan loss reserves as deductions in the
year in which they are established, thus reducing net income for that
year. The deduction, according to the IRS proposed regulations, would
only be taken in the year in which the specific loan is actually written
down. On the other hand, the Securities and Exchange Commission
allows such anticipated losses to be shown as part of the financial state-
ments of the enterprise.
A similar ambiguity is reflected in the regulatory scheme that gov-
erns debt-for-equity swaps. The debt-for-equity swap idea has been
around for some time. Prior to 1987, Chile and Mexico were actively
sponsoring this scheme. Some additional countries used the idea to
originate proposals to swap debt for conservation and ecological com-
mitments and programs. Beginning in mid-1987, however, other coun-
tries and banks further developed the debt for equity swap idea and by
the beginning of 1988, Brazil (November 1987), Argentina (October
1987) and Venezuela (April 1987) had programs in place.
Euromoney, which ran a supplement to its January 1988 issue on
"Global Debt: The Equity Solution," correctly pointed out that,
"[m]any bankers have pinned their hopes on debt/equity swaps. They
are seeking to convert their devalued loans into power plants in Chile,
textile mills in Brazil, and car plants in Mexico, in short, building in-
dustrial empires from the ruins of their LDC debt portfolios."'"" These
expectations are probably unrealistic. Nationalism and public image in
the countries must be considered when foreign interests attempt to buy
control or partial ownership in important industries or business sectors.
Other problems arise with the United States regulatory and accounting
regulations.
158. See Minimum Capital Ratios: Issuance of Directives, 12 C.F.R. pt. 3 (1988)
(presenting the risk-based capital guideline); Bank Holding Companies and Change in
Bank Control, 12 C.F.R. pt. 225, app. B (1988); see also Capital; Risk-based Capital
Guidelines, Department of the Treasury, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 12
C.F.R. pt. 3 (Docket No. 88-5); Federal Reserve System, 12 C.F.R. pt. 225, app. B
(Regulation Y; Docket No. R-0628); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 12
C.F.R. pt. 235, app. A. A useful summary of these proposals can be found in the
International Financial Law Review. Spencer & Murray-Jones, Capital adequacy. to-
wards a level playing field, INr'L FIN. L. REV., Mar. 1988, at 19.
159. Global Debt: The Equity Solution, EUROMONEY, Jan. 1988, at 3 (Supp).
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Regulation K of the Bank Holding Company Act' 60 limits bank in-
vestments overseas to activities of a banking or financial nature or re-
lated incidental activities."6 ' Depending on the amount of the invest-
ment, an overseas targeted company must have a minimum specified
percentage of its assets involved in authorized activities. The Federal
Reserve Bank liberalized Regulation K in August 1987 and again in
April 1989 to deal specifically with investments made through debt-for-
equity conversions in the countries that, since 1980, have restructured
their sovereign debt held by foreign creditors." 2 Pursuant to the
amended Regulation K, banks are allowed to purchase up to the entire
stock of a nonfinancial company in the heavily indebted countries re-
ferred to above, if it is purchased from the government: that is, if it
forms part of a privatization program, and up to forty percent of the
shares of a foreign company if it is part of the private sector.16 3
There are limits to the amount of the investment and to any subse-
quent lending to the company specified in the Regulation.164 The dispo-
sition period has been expanded to within two years of the date on
which the bank is permitted to repatriate the investment in full, but in
any event, within fifteen years of the date of acquisition. 165 For previ-
ously acquired shares or other ownership interest purchased to prevent
a loss upon debts held, the disposition period is a mere two years, al-
though the Federal Reserve Board of Governors can extend the
period.1 66
On the accounting side, one problem related to swap asset valuation
has been resolved.' 67 The "fair value" of the debt and the "fair value"
of the acquired equity are both to be considered in calculating the fair
value of the swap. 68 A further problem, however, involves the account-
ing treatment of those loans which are to be traded. To avoid the "con-
tamination" of other loans to the same country, the accountants seek to
have the banks divide their loans into investment and trading portfo-
lios.16 9 In this way, any concerns that arise on collectibility or marketa-
160. Regulation K, Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 53 Fed. Reg. 5358
(1988) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211).
161. Id. § 211.5(a).
162. .Id. § 211.5(f)(2).
163. Id. § 211.5(f)(2)(i), (ii).
164. Id. § 211.5(f)(4)(i).
165. Id.
166. Id. § 211.5(e).
167. See Evans, Bankers Proceed Cautiously With Debt/Equity Strategy,






bility of loans held in the trading portfolios for swaps would not affect
the high-grade loans held on the investment side, and, thus, leave intact
the banks' overall portfolio.
A study on Accounting and Regulatory Policies Affecting Debt Re-
structuring (the Study) concluded "that [c]urrent regulatory and ac-
counting policies have not prevented banks, that were otherwise in-
clined to do so, from participating in a wide range of negotiated debt
reduction transactions with borrowing countries."1u 0 The statement, as
far as it goes, is true. The more pertinent question, however, is whether
the three agencies are facilitating such restructuring as much as they
might if a consensus existed in the Executive Branch and the Congress
that such a restructuring was desirable.
The issue is perhaps most acutely presented in connection with rec-
ognition of loan losses. The Study notes that under Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles (GAAP) and regulatory rules, management has
the responsibility for estimating likely future losses. "Any estimated
probable losses must be recognized by a provision charged against cur-
rent income to create an allowance (reserve) for those future losses."171
The Study further notes that "[a]s losses are realized through the sale
of a bank's loans at a discount, the exchange of its loans for an equity
investment, or other means, they are charged against the loan loss re-
serve account."1 12 If the Bank has adequately estimated these losses
through the reserve account, current earnings will not be affected.
The Study observes that "[a]lthough FASB has not issued standards
which directly address developing country debt transactions, accounting
guidance issued by the AICPA [the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants] makes it clear that losses on such items as swaps,
sales, and debt exchanges generally should be charged against the loan
loss reserve. 1 71 3 If the generalized debt relief scheme were agreed to
among the parties, presumably loan loss reserves constructed in the ab-
sence of such a scheme would not suffice. The loan loss reserve would
have to be replenished by a charge against current income. If the loss,
however, were amortized over a number of years, the reserve could be
replenished more gradually, thus, reducing the immediate negative im-
170. OFFIC E OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, THE BOARD OF GovER-
NORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYSTEM, AND THE FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. STUDY ON
ACCOUNTING AND REGULATORY POLICIES AFFECTING DEBT RESTRUCTURING I (un-
published manuscript) [hereinafter STUDY ON ACCOUNTING]. The study was prepared
pursuant to a Congressional directive.
171. Id. at 6.
172. Id. at 7.
173. Id.
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pact on any one year's current income. According to the Study, how-
ever, neither GAAP or current regulatory practice permits such
amortization.174
The regulatory and tax schemes above reflect the absence at present
of a completely coherent approach among the different agencies in
Washington that have responsibility in the debt area. 1 " This ambigu-
ity, in turn, reflects the tensions among sometimes conflicting objec-
tives. On the one hand, the regulators have a responsibility to maintain
the solvency of the institutions for which they have oversight responsi-
bility; they desire to avoid congressional criticism that they are not do-
ing an effective job of regulation. As is the case with the foreign tax
credit scheme, regulators are also increasingly sensitive to possible
174. Rules for Determining the Allocation of Bank Loan Losses Under Section
865 of the Internal Revenue Code as Added by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, I.R.S.
Notice 89-57, 1989-21 I.R.B. 23 (May 22, 1989). Any reduction in principal balances
or interest rates on outstanding loans is likely to be accomplished through a buy-back
of the debt by the debtor country, an exchange of debt instruments, or through a suffi-
ciently material modification of the existing debt agreement to cause the modification
to be treated as an exchange. Consequently, it is probable that voluntary debt reduction
will result in losses on the sale or exchange of a debt instrument rather than be treated
as losses resulting from bad debt.
The IRS has resolved the question of allocating the source of such losses. The Tax
Reform Act of 1986 provided clear guidance for determining the source of gain on the
sale or exchange of personal property. Under the Tax Code, the gain is sourced to the
seller. Consequently, when a U.S. bank sells a foreign loan for a gain, the governing
rule is clear: the gain is to be considered U.S. source income. But the rule found in the
Tax Code only addresses the source of gains; it does not address the source of losses,
which was left to the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe by regulation.
A U.S. international bank asked the IRS for guidance on the source of losses arising
from the sale or exchange of LDC debt. On Friday, April 28, 1989, the IRS deter-
mined that such losses should be allocated between domestic and foreign sources on the
basis of the ratio between the tax book value in the loan portfolio between loans gener-
ating domestic source income and loans generating foreign source income, an outcome
less favorable to the banks than one which would have allowed such losses to fully off-
set domestic income. Id.
There is, however, also an issue as to what constitutes a loss for disclosure purposes.
Under the Financial Accounting Standards No. I5 (FAS 15), Accounting Debtors and
Creditors for Troubled Debt Restructuring, issued by the Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board in June 1977, where a debt instrument is exchanged for another instru-
ment with a lower interest rate and reduced principal, so long as the stream of pay-
ments (both interest and principal) exceeds the book balance of the loan, the
restructured debt is not considered "troubled" debt and no loss has been incurred.
FASB 15 interpretations are likely to be significant in any debt reduction scheme.
175. Compare UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CON-
GRESSIONAL REQUESTORS, INTERNATIONAL BANKING, SUPERVISION OF OVERSEAS
LENDING IS INADEQUATE (May 1988) (recommending "stricter reserve requirements to
more accurately reflect the high risk of IDC loans . . . .") with STUDY ON ACCOUNT-
ING, supra note 170, at 1 (stating that the three principal bank regulatory authorities
sought to demonstrate that "[c]urrent regulatory and accounting policies have not pre-
vented banks, that were otherwise inclined to do so, from participating in a wide range
of negotiated debt reduction transactions with borrowing countries.").
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abuses in the system.
On the other hand, regulators do not wish to be responsible for im-
posing disincentives which can be blamed for creating a liquidity crisis
by giving the banks an excuse to still further reduce their exposure in
the debtor countries. The conflict among these objectives leads to an
appearance of incoherence in the regulatory and tax regimes as they
impact on the continued willingness of the private banks to maintain
and increase their lending to the debtor countries. This appearance of
incoherence, however, is symptomatic of a broader lack of consensus in
Washington between the Administration and important parts of the
Congress as to how best to approach the debt issue.
The tentative approach of the parties to the debt issue is perhaps
best illustrated by the experience with the Mexican/Morgan Guaranty
swap scheme.' 76 Under this proposal, Mexico offered banks an opportu-
nity to swap government loans at a discount for new high-yield bonds
whose principal would be backed by a special issue of zero-coupon
United States Treasury securities issued only to the Mexican govern-
ment. The Mexican proposal could have resulted in a significant move
toward debt forgiveness because participating banks would forgive the
amount of the discount to face value of their loans in tendering them.
Only 139 out of more than 500 creditor banks, however, made any of-
fers and only 95 of them proposed discounts acceptable to Mexico. Ac-
cordingly, Mexico's debt was reduced by only $1.1 billion, far below
the $10 billion it had set as a target. Mexico's Director of Public
Credit, Angel Gurria, has been quoted as saying that Mexico will con-
tinue its efforts to reduce its debts and will probably try "a number of
variations on this scheme ... "I"
The Mexican bond issue reflected the frustration of the debtor coun-
tries in not being able to capture a part of the discount on their debt in
the private secondary market for their own benefit. That market itself
might be misleading as a true indicator of the value of that debt, as it
is a relatively thin market. On the other hand, absent another indica-
tor, it is the only market signal that presently exists. Although the re-
sult of the Mexican bond issue was generally considered to be disap-
176. See Orme, Mexico Prepares New Proposals As Debt Bond Offer Disappoints,
J. Com., Mar. 7, 1988, at 7A (analyzing the Morgan Guarantee Trust supported Mexi-
can debt swap). See generally K. Telljohann and R. Buckholz, The Mexican Bond
Exchange Offer: An Analytical Framework, Salomon Brothers, Inc. (Jan. 1988)
177. Pine, Pressure to Revamp Third World Debt Strategy Mounting, L.A. Times,
Mar. 11, 1988, IV, at 1; see also, Mexico's Plan to Reduce Debt is Short of Goal,
Wall St. J., Mar. 4, 1988, at 4 (noting that Mexico's plan to reduce the nation's for-
eign bank debt has fallen short of expectations).
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pointing, in my opinion, it did mark an evolution in official thinking
regarding the debt issue. For the first time, the United States Treasury
participated in a scheme that had as its explicit purpose a voluntary
"forgiveness" by the private banks of a part of the principal amount of
the outstanding debt.
178
Moreover, the Mexican scheme led to a further definition of the
"common law" governing the prevailing accounting and regulatory
rules. The bank regulators and accountants accepted that exchanging a
given amount of existing indebtedness for new issues in a lesser face
amount would not contaminate the remainder of the debt retained by
the Banks. 179 Hence, the remaining indebtedness would not need to be
written down to the level of the discounted debt that had been ex-
changed. In other words, the regulatory and accounting authorities im-
plicitly accepted that debt forgiveness may actually enhance the value
of the outstanding indebtedness. 80
REFLECTIONS
In light of the foregoing, what we are witnessing in Washington is a
period of experimentation. Ideas are percolating. They are tested, dis-
carded, modified, sent back for retooling, or abandoned altogether.
There is as yet no consensus between the Administration and Congress
as to how to approach the debt and development issue. With this in
mind, let me suggest six items that should be considered in the evolu-
tion of any new consensus.
First, the debt crisis is not the result only of mistaken policies in the
debtor countries. It represents a shared responsibility among debtor
countries, creditor banks, and creditor countries. Each one of the par-
ties in the period 1974-82 had a part in ignoring the clear warning
signs of an impending storm. Judgments as to the relative responsibili-
ties of the major parties to the debt crisis-mistaken policies of the
debtor countries, short-sighted lending policies of the private banks, the
failure of public officials to appreciate the gravity of the problem, and
excessive reliance on a market solution to the problem-are therefore
inappropriate. No one party should disproportionately bear the burden
of the economic adjustments that are the consequence of the recycling
strategy of the 1974-82 period.
178. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, STAFF ACCOUNTING BULLETIN
No. 75, 17 C.F.R. PT. 211, at 4-5 (Jan. 4, 1988) (expressing the staff's views regarding






Second, it became evident in 1974 and thereafter that a group of
highly indebted, newly industrializing countries had achieved world
class status in the international economy. In 1974, the industrialized
countries generally adjusted to the domestic oil price rises of 1973-74
by adopting deflationary economic policies. The continued borrowing
and economic expansion of the NICs, however, provided a growing
market for industrialized country exports, particularly capital goods,
that eased the domestic economic contraction in those industrialized
countries. Whether this was a wise policy on the part of the NICs is
not here at issue. The significant point is that the economies of the
NICs as a group were of such a size that they made a significant differ-
ence (by virtue of their continued imports) in mitigating the recessive
effects of the economic adjustment effort in the industrialized countries.
The NICs cannot be relegated to bystander status on the major deci-
sions as to the future shape of the international economy. They are
demanding a significant voice in decision making in the institutions
that are at the center of the international economy. This is reflected in
the impasse that unfortunately existed for nearly four years in the ne-
gotiations concerning the increase in resources for the IDB.
Third, the emergence of the NICs into the international economy as
world class players means that they, too, have had to accept limitations
on their own economic autonomy. Brazil's unilateral moratorium on
debt service payments had to be abandoned in large part because the
Sao Paulo industrial entrepreneurs have become such an integral part
of the international economy that they cannot afford to be isolated
from conventional financial and economic relationships. Unilateral ac-
tion to limit debt service is therefore perceived as more harmful than
useful by a politically powerful part of Brazil's economic leadership.
Conversely, as the recent report of the Overseas Development Council
observes, it is likely that the United States will find it more difficult to
resolve its trade imbalances without renewed sustained economic
growth in the NICs, particularly in Latin America.""' It is in the eco-
nomic self interest of both the United States and the debtor countries
for these countries to resume their role as net importers rather than
exporters of capital.
Fourth, a debt strategy that places disproportionate emphasis upon
the highly indebted countries running huge trade surpluses with the
United States as a means of paying the debt service on outstanding
loans is likely to create a political backlash in the United States. To the
181. See AGENDA 1988, supra note 119, at 42. The report states that the "U.S.
prosperity is inextricably linked to the achievement of global development." Id.
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extent that trade surplus is achieved by compressing imports as well as
an aggressive export drive to the United States market, the perception
in the United States will grow of an unfair trade imbalance that
prejudices the interests of American factory workers. That is essentially
what happened as a consequence of the strategy that was followed in
the period 1982-85.1s2
It may be that, in fact, the exports of the highly indebted countries
are, relatively, not that great a factor in the United States trade deficit
compared to the trade surpluses of Japan and the European Economic
Community. To the extent that the perception exists that the imbal-
ance is unfair, however, it will lead to increased demands within the
United States for greater industrial protection and more aggressive
measures to open foreign markets to American goods. The devaluation
of the dollar as a means of coping with this problem has limits, both as
to its feasibility in an open international trading system and, domesti-
cally, in the United States in cheapening American domestic assets for
foreign purchasers. A debt strategy that relies excessively on trade sur-
pluses earned in the United States market by aggressive debtor country
exporting and compressing of imports will be self defeating.
This is not to say that there should be less emphasis upon becoming
internationally competitive in exports. On the contrary, this is a sine
qua non in an increasingly competitive international economy. It is to
say that a better balance among exporting, importing, and development
finance is essential. My own view is that some element of debt relief
must be a part of such a balance. The form and amount of such relief,
however, are not as yet within reach of a consensus.
Fifth, it is unlikely that a single development model can be imposed
upon the diverse conditions that prevail in the debtor countries. The
debtor countries vary considerably in the way they have adjusted to the
oil price revolution of the 1970s and the changing economic circum-
stances of the 1980s. But it is a mistake to believe that what worked in
South Korea can be easily transposed to the Latin American context.
The social and political conditions are too different and are different
even among Latin American countries themselves. Furthermore, there
will be differences of emphasis in the countries among competing con-
182. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the eco-
nomic downturn of developing countries on the U.S. economy); see also Integration of
U.S. Policies on Trade, Exchange Rates, and the Accumulated Debts of Less-Devel-
oped Countries, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade of the Senate Comm.
on Finance, 99th Cong. 2d Sess., 61 (1986) (statement of Prof. Jeffrey D. Sachs,




siderations of social equity, economic efficiency, and political systems.
The result at times is likely to lead to less than optimum economic
efficiency. Economic efficiency, however, is not the only criterion that
countries will follow in their decision making. The dilemma in Latin
America may be most acute in redefining the role of the state in eco-
nomic and social development, a central tenet of the Baker Plan. It is
true that with the advent of the debt crisis in 1982, the economic model
of high economic growth achieved by foreign borrowing, largely by the
public sector, became discredited. 183 Moreover, the association in Latin
America of such public sector expansion with the military governments
of the 1960s and 1970s helped to create an internal climate in a num-
ber of countries that was propitious for reducing the scope of the public
sector in the economy. There are, however, other factors that militate
against too radical an attack on the role of the public sector in the
economy. Private enterprises in Sao Paulo, Brazil, and Mendoza, Ar-
gentina, for example, may have resented the explosive growth of the
state-owned autonomous entities, but these private firms themselves are
often undercapitalized. They depend upon the national development
banks for credit and, often, upon the public sector for orders, although
this dependence may now be diminishing as they become internation-
ally competitive.
The Alliance for Progress of the 1960s, with its emphasis upon social
reforms, however modest, encouraged an expansion of the educational
system in Latin American countries. In the 1970s, the fruits of this
expansion became apparent in the increased cadres of University grad-
uates. In Brazil, for example, between 1970 and 1985, the number of
University graduates tripled; graduates found employment in many
cases in the state-owned enterprises.1 8' In effect, the public sector be-
came a vehicle for social mobility and the path to middle class status
183. See, e.g., Bartlett, A Vicious Circle Keeps Latin America in Debt, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 15, 1989, at E5 (noting the debt crisis); Carlos Menem, A Peronist Who
May Rule Like A Pragmatist, Bus. WEEK, July 3, 1989, at 41 (examining a perceived
shift towards economic privatization in Latin America). In Brazil, however, the failure
to curb spending by the state enterprises and thereby reduce the Government's fiscal
deficit led to the resignation of the Finance Minister, Mr. Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira.
The issues which led to the Minister's resignation are discussed in a particularly per-
ceptive article by the New York Times correspondent in Brazil, Alan Riding. Riding,
States Role Key Issue for Brazil, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 1987, at D8.
184. The high social cost of Brazilian education expenditures were analyzed in a
Report by the World Bank Staff. WORLD BANK, BRAzIL, PUBUC SPENDING ON SO-
CIAL PROGRAMS: ISSUES AND OPTIONS 39-42 (Vol. I, May 27, 1988). The document is
designated for official use only, but its basic points were reported in the Brazilian press;
see, e.g., Journal do Brasil, July 17, 1988, Economia. Governo Fracassa nos Programas
Socias, I caderno, at 21.
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for significant numbers of Latin Americans. And it was the middle
class that was the backbone for the opposition political parties that
turned against the military governments and came to power in the mid-
dle 1980s.' 85
President Raul Alfonsin of Argentina observed that the basic princi-
ple underlying his government's economic program was the need for
Argentina to become economically more efficient:
A key element in our program is our belief that a greater insertion of Argentina
in world trade flows is a precondition for sustained growth. In the past, and for
some time, the Argentine economy was able to expand under the rules of the
game of a semi-autarkic model. However, this kind of development was pro-
longed beyond a reasonable period. The time has come to settle accounts with
the shortsightedness which relegated us to stagnation, while the world witnessed
an expansion of markets and the technological revolution. 181
Alfonsin, in words that would have been unthinkable ten years ago,
further stated:
Subsidies and regulations have discouraged innovation and competitiveness.
Argentineans have no choice: either we begin a growth process more closely asso-
ciated with private investment, relying less on state enterprises and the granting
of fiscal and credit privileges to the private sector or we will quite simply be
perpetuating inflation and stagnation.1
8 7
This observation, in my opinion, is now generally shared, by and large,
in most countries in Latin America. But the pace at which this objec-
tive can be accomplished is also limited by past development
experience.
Hence, there is a fundamental ambivalence about the role of the
public sector in Latin America. Understood in this context, major ad-
vances have been achieved in trimming and defining a different role for
the public sector in economic growth. External pressure, however, that
seeks to force the pace beyond the tolerance of domestic political pos-
sibilities, could engender a dangerous political backlash in debtor
countries.
185. See, e.g., CRASSWEILLER, JUAN D. PERON AND THE ENIGMAS OF ARGENTINA
55-79 (1988) (analyzing the social roots of Peronism and the contrasting Radical
party). In Argentina, the Radical Party of President Raul Alfonsin is generally consid-
ered to have its political base in the Argentine middle class, in contrast to the leading
opposition party, the Peronistas, which is based upon the Argentine working class. Id.
In Brazil, the majority party, the Movimento Democratic Brasileira (MDB) is a more
amorphous conglomeration of forces, but basically it has been urban middle class in
origin and is being challenged by a political party, the Partido Trabalhista (PT), which
arose out of the organized wage sector in Sao Paulo.
186. Remarks by President of the Argentine Republic Raul Alfonsin, Americas So-




Finally, any economic adjustment program which is to be sustainable
must, in my opinion, deal with the social question. That question, as
Hannah Arendt, the noted political scientist has observed in her classic
work, On Revolution, is "what we may better and more simply call the
existence of poverty. Poverty is more than deprivation, it is a state of
constant want and acute misery whose ignominy consists in its dehu-
manizing force." 88 The return to democratic forms of government in
much of the Southern Hemisphere is subject to the tensions that derive
from this condition for great numbers of people in the debtor countries.
As Arendt noted, "the transformation of the Rights of Man into the
rights of Sans-Culottes was the turning point not only of the French
Revolution but of all revolutions that were to follow."'189 No elected
government can ignore the social question, given the abysmal condi-
tions of life that exist among too much of the population in many of the
highly indebted countries. Hence, an economic adjustment program
that ignores this question is not likely, over time, to be politically and
socially sustainable, a fact that is increasingly recognized in the inter-
national financial agencies.
On March 10, 1989, Secretary of Treasury, Nicholas F. Brady in a
speech to a conference on Third World Debt sponsored by the Bretton
Woods Committee and the Brookings Institution explicitly endorsed
debt reduction as a necessary part of American Strategy: "The path
towards greater credit worthiness and a return to the markets for many
debtor countries needs to involve debt reduction." This general declara-
tion by the Secretary was not accompanied by a detailed plan as to how
debt reduction should be accomplished. Rather, like the Baker speech
in Seoul in October 1985, the Brady speech appeared to be a response
to pressures building in Latin America for a change in the then prevail-
ing debt strategy. In 1985, the election of Alan Garcia as President in
Peru and his declaration that Peru would henceforth limit its debt ser-
vice payments to a percentage of exports stimulated the change in pol-
icy embodied in Baker's speech towards economic growth rather than
austerity. In February 1989, a newly elected President in Venezuela,
Carlos Andres Perez, implemented economic austerity measures as part
of an agreed program with the IMF. Gasoline and transportation fares
were increased while subsidies were reduced. Riots in Caracas ensued;
more than 200 people died. The Brady initiative endorsing debt relief
was widely perceived as being, in part, a response to the social unrest
evidence in the Caracas riots. The Brady speech envisioned a role in
188. H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 54 (1963).
189. Id. at 55.
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debt reduction for the IMF and the World Bank, but the details were
not agreed among the creditor governments, the private commercial
banks, and the debtor countries.
